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Zenith soccer coach now. Semak expects difficulties as the head coach of Zenit

The list of candidates for Zenit coaches is not final

On Monday, the management of the St. Petersburg club reduced the shortlist of candidates for the vacant post of head coach after the resignation of Roberto Mancini from five to three. But who was struck out? And is the list of potential successors of the Italian limited to the originally announced surnames?

SPEND LESS, EARN MORE

We recall that Zenit itself, on the eve of the meeting of the Board of Directors in the Gazprom office, named Sergei Semak, Maurizio Sarri, Paulo Fonseca, Marcelo Gallardo and Jorge Sampaoli as candidates. The club even conducted a fan vote on social media to find out which head coach the people preferred. According to the poll results, as expected, “his” Semak won (63.8 percent of the votes). Next came Italian Sarri (19.8), Portuguese Fonseca (6.4), Argentines Sampaoli (6.1) and Gallardo (3.9). And after the board of directors, which was attended by Semak and was sharply criticized by Alexei Miller, the president of Zenit Sergei Fursenko, there was information about the withdrawal from the "race" of two participants. True, without specifying the names.

Articles | The best is Fonseca, but Semak will be chosen: who will become the new coach of Zenit

Until the final decision is made, it's time to open the guessing game: who was deleted and who is still being considered. But how do you compare specialists so different in age, experience, number of titles and transfer requests? Zenit's shortlist again caused an outside observer to feel the lack of a coherent medium-term strategy. Everything last years every offseason she was formed in a hurry, under the chosen coach, and not vice versa, as it should be. And each time they easily refused it in order to re-clean the rubble after the next resignation. In such conditions, the participants in the struggle for the seat of the head coach of Zenit were usually measured by pomp or popularity, and not by the number of professional merits within the framework of criteria clearly formulated by the management.

And yet the situation at Zenit is changing. Conversations with people who are in close cooperation with the club convince that they do not intend to step on the old rake in St. Petersburg. A general line was drawn at the board of directors: first, to decide on the principles of development for the next few years, and to choose a coach for them.

The main rule of the new Zenit is to spend less and earn more. From this point of view, Semak is an ideal candidate. Obviously, the salary of the head coach of Ufa will be at least five times less than what Sarri or Fonseca would agree to. Semak clearly did not put forward conditions like “I’m waiting for those who score, which means expensive forwards”, answering the questions of the Gazprom bosses. And Sergei Bogdanovich has a second powerful trump card. This summer, not only Artem Dzyuba and Oleg Shatov will return to Zenit from loan, but also a dozen other players (Robert Mak, Ibrahim Tsallagov, Ernani, and so on). Semak knows all of them well from work in coaching staffs Luciano Spalletti and André Villas-Boas. This means that it will be easier for him to put together an efficient team from the available resources.

SEMAK, EXPANSION AND LAWYER

Therefore, those who do not believe in the 42-year-old are wrong. Russian coach only on the basis that Zenit is not an experimental testing ground. The situation has changed radically. As part of the new development concept, spending under 100 million euros and distributing 17 people for rent for the fifth place and the third consecutive flight past the Champions League became an experiment (and bold). It turns out that Semak can be congratulated in advance on the appointment? Still no.

The experience of cooperation with Vlstimil Petrzhela should be recognized as successful: from that moment until the present, the club invites specialists from abroad to work (exceptions - Anatoly Davydov and Sergey Semak who worked with the prefix "acting" several matches in 2009 and 2014, respectively *). It is curious that if at first each new foreign specialist worked almost as long and even longer than his predecessor, then in recent times legionnaire coaches do not stay at Zenit for a long time. Vlastimil Petrzhela and Dick Advocaat worked for more than three years, Luciano Spalletti for almost four years, Andre Villas-Boas lasted for two years, and Mircea Lucescu and (most likely) Roberto Mancini had a “shelf life” only for a season. During our work, in this case, we take the interval from the first to the last official match at the head of "Zenith".

If Mancini leaves Zenit at the end of the 2017/18 season, he will become the first foreign coach in history to have failed to win a single title with the blue-white-blue.

* - at the end of the 2009 season Davydov was approved as head coach; after the 30th round, he left his post.

Vlastimil Petrzela (Czech Republic): 3 years, a month and 18 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 145 matches +73 = 41 -31; balls 245-151; 59.7% points

Titles: Premier League Cup (2003)

Dick Advocaat (Holland): 3 years, a month and 3 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 139 matches +68 = 42 -29; balls 234-143; 58.9% points

Titles: champion of Russia (2007); Russian Super Cup (2008); UEFA Cup (2007/08); UEFA Super Cup (2008)

Luciano Spalletti (Italy): 3 years, 11 months and 24 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 184 matches +105 = 47 -32; balls 325-176; 65.5% points (including two technical defeats in the Czech Republic)

Titles: champion of Russia (2010, 2011/12); Russian Cup (2009/10); Russian Super Cup (2011)

André Villas-Boas (Portugal): 2 years, month and 27 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 101 matches +62 = 20 -19; balls 195-88; 67.9% points

Titles: champion of Russia (2014/15); Russian Cup (2015/16); Russian Super Cup (2015)

Mircea Lucescu (Romania): 9 months and 28 days

Statistics in all tournaments: 41 matches +26 = 7 -8; balls 76-34; 71.9% points

Titles: Russian Super Cup (2017)

Roberto Mancini (Italy): 9 months and 17 days (for today)

Statistics in all tournaments: 43 matches +21 = 13 -9; balls 68-34; 58.9% points

Titles: -

Used photos: FC Zenit; "Sports Day by Day" (Igor Ozersky)

Konstantin Lemeshev* 1941 (to May) 3 0 2 1 3-4 Mikhail Okun* May - June 1941 5 2 1 2 9-10 Konstantin Kvashnin* 1943 Konstantin Lemeshev 1944-1945 22 8 7 7 35-31 USSR Cup Winner 1944 Mikhail Butusov 1946 14 4 2 8 12-25 Ivan Talanov 1946-1948 42 13 8 21 53-86 Konstantin Lemeshev 1948-1950 84 36 19 29 130-136 Georgy Lasin ** 1950-1951 30 12 8 10 42-42 Vladimir Lemeshev 1952-1954 37 18 3 16 49-52 Nikolay Lyukshinov 1954-1955 42 12 15 15 46-52 Arkady Alov 1956-1957 32 5 14 13 35-65 Georgy Zharkov 1957-1960 76 29 20 27 119-114 Gennady Bondarenko 1960 10 5 1 4 13-12 Evgeny Eliseev 1961-1964 117 39 36 42 159-150 Valentin Fedorov 1964-1966 85 27 25 33 86-97 Arkady Alov 1967 36 6 9 21 28-63 Artyom Falyan 1968-1970 82 21 28 33 73-104 Evgeny Goryansky 1970-1972 80 27 25 28 93-84 German Zonin 1973-1977 146 41 57 48 160-177 Vladimir Kornev** August - October 1977 7 3 1 3 12-10 Yuri Morozov October 1977-1982 170 58 47 65 206-222 Bronze medalist of the USSR Championship 1980 Pavel Sadyrin December 23, 1982 -
June 1987 148 63 42 43 205-160 Finalist of the USSR Cup 1984
USSR Champion 1984
Winner of the USSR Season Cup 1985 Vladimir Golubev 1987 (from July) 14 4 4 6 14-15 Stanislav Zavidonov December 17, 1987 -
July 1, 1989 39 13 10 16 39-47 Vladimir Golubev 1989 (from May) 21 3 8 10 20-35 Anatoly Konkov January - May 1990 7 1 3 3 5-9 Vyacheslav Bulavin 1990 (from May) 31 7 11 13 30-32 Yuri Morozov 1991 - March 1992 42 11 14 17 44-50 Vyacheslav Melnikov March 1992-1994 110 49 28 33 167-127 Pavel Sadyrin December 1994-
November 4, 1996 76 37 9 30 97-79 Bronze medalist of the First League 1995 Anatoly Byshovets November 22, 1996 -
November 22, 1998 64 25 21 18 70-54 Anatoly Davydov ** September 24, 1998, and. O.
November 24, 1998 -
April 25, 2000 35 11 12 12 39-39 Winner of the Russian Cup 1998/99 Yuri Morozov from April 25, 2000, and. O.
May 31, 2000 -
July 5, 2002 67 33 19 15 102-67 Finalist of the Intertoto Cup 2000
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2001
Russian Cup finalist 2001/02 Mikhail Biryukov 5'th of July -
August 26, 2002, and. O. 9 2 2 5 14-17 Boris Rappoport August, 26th -
November 17, 2002 9 0 4 5 7-14 Vlastimil Petrzhela November 29, 2002-
May 3, 2006 96 48 25 23 159-106 Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2003
Winner of the Premier League Cup 2003 Vladimir Borovichka May 3-17, 2006, and. O. 3 1 1 1 3-4 Dick Advocate June 26, 2006-
August 10, 2009 98 46 33 19 165-103 Champion of Russia 2007
Russian Super Cup 2008
UEFA Cup Winner 2007/08
2008 UEFA Super Cup Winner Anatoly Davydov from August 10, 2009, and. O.
October 3 -
December 11, 2009 13 9 3 1 24-8 Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2009 Luciano Spalletti December 11, 2009 -
11 March 2014 124 74 37 13 239-106 Winner of the Russian Cup 2009/10
Champion of Russia 2010
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2011
Champion of Russia 2011/12
Russian Super Cup finalist 2012
Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2012/13
Finalist of the Russian Super Cup 2013 Sergey Semak March 11-20, 2014, and. O. 1 0 0 1 0-1 André Villas-Boas March 20, 2014-
May 21, 2016 69 44 16 9 142-60 Silver medalist of the Russian Championship 2013/14
Champion of Russia 2014/15
Winner of the Russian Super Cup 2015
Winner of the Russian Cup 2015/16
Bronze medalist of the Russian Championship 2015/16 Mircea Lucescu since 24 May 2016 0 0 0 0 0-0 Russian Super Cup 2016

** Lasin in September 1950 replaced K. Lemeshev in away matches, Kornev replaced Zonin in August-October 1977, Davydov replaced Byshovets in October 1998. Match statistics were taken into account for Lemeshev, Zonin and Byshovets, for Kornev they are highlighted separately for clarity.

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If the generals were guided by reasonable reasons, it seemed how clear it should have been for Napoleon that, having gone two thousand miles and taking battle with the probable accident of losing a quarter of the army, he was going to certain death; and it should have seemed just as clear to Kutuzov that by accepting the battle and also risking losing a quarter of the army, he would probably lose Moscow. For Kutuzov it was mathematically clear, how clear is that if I have less than one checker in checkers and I change, I will probably lose and therefore should not change.
When the opponent has sixteen checkers, and I have fourteen, then I am only one-eighth weaker than him; and when I exchange thirteen pieces, he will be three times stronger than me.
Before the Battle of Borodino, our forces were approximately five to six of the French, and after the battle as one to two, that is, before the battle of one hundred thousand; one hundred and twenty, and after the battle fifty to a hundred. At the same time, the clever and experienced Kutuzov took up the battle. Napoleon, the genius commander, as he is called, gave battle, losing a quarter of his army and further stretching his line. If they say that, having occupied Moscow, he thought how to end the campaign by occupying Vienna, then there is a lot of evidence against this. The historians of Napoleon themselves say that he also wanted to stop from Smolensk, knew the danger of his extended position, knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, because from Smolensk he saw in what position the Russian cities were left to him, and did not receive a single answer to their repeated statements about the desire to negotiate.
Giving and accepting the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov and Napoleon acted involuntarily and senselessly. And historians, under the accomplished facts, only later summed up cunning evidence of the foresight and genius of the commanders, who of all the involuntary instruments of world events were the most slavish and involuntary figures.
The ancients left us with samples of heroic poems, in which heroes constitute the whole interest of history, and we still cannot get used to the fact that for our human time a story of this kind does not make sense.
On another question: how the Borodino and the Shevardinskoye battles that preceded it were given - there is also a very definite and well-known, completely false idea. All historians describe the case as follows:
The Russian army allegedly, in its retreat from Smolensk, was looking for the best position for a general battle, and such a position was allegedly found at Borodino.
The Russians allegedly fortified this position forward, to the left of the road (from Moscow to Smolensk), at an almost right angle to it, from Borodino to Utitsa, in the very place where the battle took place.
Ahead of this position, a fortified forward post on the Shevardinsky kurgan was supposedly set up to observe the enemy. On the 24th, it was as if Napoleon attacked an advanced post and took it; On the 26th, he attacked the entire Russian army, which was stationed at the Borodino field.
This is what the stories say, and all this is completely unfair, as anyone who wants to understand the essence of the matter will easily see.
The Russians weren't looking for a better position; but, on the contrary, in their retreat they passed many positions that were better than Borodinskaya. They did not stop at any of these positions: both because Kutuzov did not want to accept the position he had not chosen, and because the demand for a popular battle had not yet been expressed strongly enough, and because Miloradovich had not yet approached with the militia, and also because other reasons that are incalculable. The fact is that the previous positions were stronger and that the Borodino position (the one on which the battle was given) is not only not strong, but for some reason is not at all a position more than any other place in the Russian Empire, which, guessing, would be pointed with a pin on the map.
The Russians not only did not strengthen the position of the Borodino field to the left at a right angle from the road (that is, the place where the battle took place), but they never, until August 25, 1812, thought about the possibility of a battle taking place at this place. This is proved, firstly, by the fact that not only on the 25th there were no fortifications on this place, but that, begun on the 25th, they were not completed on the 26th; secondly, the position of the Shevardinsky redoubt serves as a proof: the Shevardinsky redoubt, in front of the position at which the battle was accepted, does not make any sense. Why was this redoubt stronger than all the other points? And why, defending him on the 24th until late at night, were all efforts exhausted and six thousand people lost? A Cossack patrol was enough to observe the enemy. Thirdly, proof that the position at which the battle took place was not foreseen and that the Shevardinsky redoubt was not the forefront of this position is the fact that Barclay de Tolly and Bagration until the 25th were convinced that the Shevardinsky redoubt was left flank of the position and that Kutuzov himself, in his report, written in the heat of the moment after the battle, calls the Shevardinsky redoubt the left flank of the position. Much later, when reports on the Battle of Borodino were written in the open, it was (probably to justify the mistakes of the commander-in-chief, who has to be infallible) that unfair and strange testimony was invented that the Shevardinsky redoubt served as an advanced post (while it was only a fortified point of the left flank) and as if the battle of Borodino was taken by us on a fortified and pre-selected position, while it took place in a completely unexpected and almost unfortified place.
The case, obviously, was like this: the position was chosen along the Kolocha River, which crosses the main road not at a right, but at an acute angle, so that the left flank was in Shevardino, the right one near the village of Novy and the center in Borodino, at the confluence of the Kolocha and Vo rivers yny. This position, under the cover of the Kolocha River, for the army, with the aim of stopping the enemy moving along the Smolensk road to Moscow, is obvious to anyone who looks at the Borodino field, forgetting how the battle took place.
Napoleon, having left on the 24th to Valuev, did not see (as the stories say) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodino (he could not see this position, because it was not there) and did not see the forward post of the Russian army, but stumbled upon the pursuit of the Russian rearguard to the left flank of the Russian position, to the Shevardinsky redoubt, and unexpectedly for the Russians, he transferred troops through Kolocha. And the Russians, not having time to enter the general battle, retreated with their left wing from the position they intended to take, and took up a new position, which was not foreseen and not fortified. By going to left side Kolochi, to the left of the road, Napoleon moved the entire future battle from right to left (from the Russians) and transferred it to the field between Utitsa, Semenovsky and Borodino (to this field, which has nothing more advantageous for the position than any other field in Russia ), and on this field the entire battle took place on the 26th. In rough form, the plan for the intended battle and the battle that took place would be as follows:

If Napoleon had not gone to Kolocha on the evening of the 24th and had not ordered to attack the redoubt in the evening, but would have started the attack the next morning, no one would have doubted that the Shevardinsky redoubt was the left flank of our position; and the battle would have happened as we expected it. In that case, we would probably defend even more stubbornly the Shevardinsky redoubt, our left flank; would attack Napoleon in the center or on the right, and on the 24th a general engagement would take place in the position that was fortified and foreseen. But since the attack on our left flank took place in the evening, following the retreat of our rearguard, that is, immediately after the battle at Gridnevaya, and since the Russian commanders did not want or did not have time to start a general battle on the 24th evening, the first and main action of Borodinsky the battle was lost on the 24th and, obviously, led to the loss of the one that was given on the 26th.
After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt, by the morning of the 25th, we found ourselves out of position on the left flank and were forced to bend back our left wing and hastily strengthen it wherever it was.
But not only did the Russian troops stand only under the protection of weak, unfinished fortifications on August 26, the disadvantage of this situation was increased by the fact that the Russian military leaders, not fully recognizing the fact that they had completely accomplished (the loss of position on the left flank and the transfer of the entire future battlefield from right to left ), remained in their extended position from the village of Novy to Utitsa and, as a result, had to move their troops during the battle from right to left. Thus, during the entire battle, the Russians had twice the weakest forces against the entire French army aimed at our left wing. (The actions of Poniatovsky against Utitsa and Uvarov on the right flank of the French were separate from the course of the battle.)

Mancini was disgraced.

The Italian coach burst into St. Petersburg with a dashing goal by Daler Kuzyaev and super football from Sebastian Driussi. The stands were inspired by: new president brought in a champion manager who reveals Russian youth and chooses the right legionnaires. Around - a gorgeous stadium. Ahead is a warm-up victory in the Premier League before a comeback to the Champions League. We'll grab another European Cup on the way. Finally, everything will be fine. Yeah.

Mancini interrupted the stinking aftertaste from Lucescu's swoop. The hammered Argentine striker has turned into a second-rate Argentine diaspora, and such a haphazard use of Kuzyaev's talent is difficult to imagine even under the substance. The bend was finally finished off by Dziuba's castling on Zabolotny. The latter also poured fuel for the trolls - with a debut goal in an unnecessary () match against the comatose SKA. If anything, even Erokhin put poker there.

But the club's reaction to the disaster is perfectly adequate. Fursenko warned of hostilities by early dismissal of Roberto, and he chooses a new coach together with the people. Zenit announced the shortlist of candidates through the millionth fan at Krestovsky - it's beautiful. And then, who from this list should be trusted with the team. This is far-sighted.

Sergey Semak

pros... Sergei Bogdanovich is a self-evident choice. "Zenith" does not need trophies and loud transfers: first you need to wipe the dirt from your own emblem. The once most soulful team in the league has turned into a money bag. Own pupils and just Russian guys bring scandals out of the team, and mercenaries take their place. The fans forgot when the footballer made his way to the base straight from the academy. A strange connection with politics has formed in the club. The only light spot is Tymoshchuk's hairstyle on the bench. If Semak appears next to her, the good image can be restored.

There is no doubt about his humanity and orientation. Sergei will find a common language even with cormorants at Krestovsky. He will not harm or merge ahead of time, like Lucescu and Mancini. He will not put the Russian guy under dubious legionnaires and will definitely fit in for the team in front of the judges. Zenit knew that the fans would choose Semak and did correct move, appointing it as if by the hands of fans. With him, it will not be shameful to root for the people of St. Petersburg again. This is the most important thing now.

Minuses... But, probably, it will be necessary to sink for Semakov's “Zenith” through defeats. The result of the young coach at Ufa is extremely worthy in terms of price-quality ratio. But managing a roster of spoiled stars on a win-it-all challenge is another matter. This requires either a hypertalent (like Zidane's) or experience. Semak has neither one nor the other. But again, are victories so important?

Probability of appointment: almost certainly

pros... Zenit fails so badly with legionnaire coaches that taking a new foreigner = unleashing a cold war with the fans. But Sarri is almost the only coach in the world whose authority will make Petersburgers forget about passports and citizenships for at least six months. His schemes at Napoli are openly admired by Guardiola and Mourinho, and his name can magnetize really cool players to Krestovsky. For example, Mertens or Jorginho.

Minuses... Maurizio is insanely expensive. He hinted boldly about the desire to leave Naples, automatically lining up a line of superclubs for his labor. Chelsea is trying more actively than the rest - to beat the Italian from Abramovich, you need to shell out a really dangerous amount of money. When bad results(no one is insured) it will be impossible to explain the numbers in Sarri's contract. Then the Cold War will become nuclear.

Probability of appointment: first candidate after Semak

Jorge Sampaoli

pros... In the 2016/17 season, Sampaoli and Conte revived a three-defender scheme. The Argentinean's Sevilla rolled into the Champions League, and the coach's own shares skyrocketed. Jorge was immediately recruited by the Argentine national team. Surely the last world championship for Lionel Messi is a serious matter. The quality of Sampaoli is also proved by the fact that the Andalusians crawled down after his departure. This year, Sevilla's peak is a defeat by Barcelona in the King's Cup final.

Minuses... The Argentinean's talent is undeniable. But there is no fundamental difference in class between Sampaoli, Spalletti and even Mancini. Jorge's choice is another attempt to get trophies in the shortest possible way, and not build a long-term project through hardships to the stars. If Fursenko again follows the strategy of the carpet, then Sampaoli may not leave Russia after the World Cup.

Probability of appointment: very unlikely

Paulo Fonseca and Marcelo Gallardo

Minuses... These characters have no clear advantages. What could be dumber than luring Shakhtar's coach almost immediately after Lucescu? Call a no-name from "River Plate" for a crowd of faded and unloved Argentines. It is pointless to describe further. Let's just hope that these guys are not really on the short list of St. Petersburg residents. And their names in the voting are yet another self-irony of Zenit. With her, the blue-white-blue are in complete order.

Probability of appointment: tends to zero

). The SE columnist tells how the situation can develop.

Sergey Egorov

The meeting of the board of directors of the St. Petersburg club did not officially have the task of choosing a new head coach. According to my information, the main item on the agenda sounded like this: "The development strategy of the club." The management of “Zenith” prepared it, but in the end it was decided to finalize the document.

It is clear that the strategy also contained a sports component - perhaps it was also about the fact that Special attention it is necessary to devote to homegrown football players, taking into account a) the remaining limit, albeit in the future for the next two years; b) the UEFA rules for such players in the UEFA competition application; c) the problem with the lack of locals in Zenit, which is sometimes felt by the mood of the public.

Sergey SEMAK. Photo by Vyacheslav EVDOKIMOV / FC Zenit

After reaching the Champions League playoffs, PAULO FONSECA came to the press conference wearing a Zorro suit. What else will the Shakhtar coach surprise you with? Photo REUTERS

FONSECA

A very strange story has developed with. According to my information, the Dutchman was indeed a candidate, but even before the meeting of the board of directors, the topic was removed from the agenda.

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