Newbie "Oilman"Evgeny Krutikovtold how he was accepted in the new team.

- This is my debut match for Neftyanik and it's great that I managed to win. For me, the most important thing was to play stricter for the first match, without mistakes. In the first period, I acted like this - neatly, so that it would be more reliable. Then I understood the scheme of the game and began to feel more confident. And I really liked the style in which we began to play later, I think we succeeded. Spartak style is already in the past. Now new team and as the coach says, I will play to be useful

– Feel trust coaching staff? Your link today and in the majority went out, and was released for overtime. And you did not disappoint.

- Yes, it's very nice to see such trust - thanks to the coaches. Perhaps because we were good at it. And it's good that we managed to score.

– How do you like in the new team, and even with your own style?

– Very positive experience. Serious team. Moreover, I moved from Buran, its financial problems are well known. And here– it's a pleasure to be in such a team. The team is good, we will work,- said Krutikov the official website of "Oilman".

It is a pity that it was impossible to "protect" all the guys from this team. Skutar and Shabunov left for Novokuznetsk, Ilyin - for Novosibirsk, Vorobiev ended up in Chekhov in transit through the team of St. Petersburg's "Silver Lions", Makarenko now plays for SKA, Remov - in Orenburg.

At the beginning preparatory phase the coaches of the "youth team" immediately identified Pugolovkin, Shkenin and Krutikov in one link. It was this combination of attackers that turned out to be the most stable, highly productive and, most importantly, reliable when playing on the defensive. In such cases, they say

what a fusion of youth and experience has turned out. The guys complemented each other very well. The center forward - veteran and team captain Nikolai Shkenin (who feels great not only in attack, but also in defense - in pre-season training matches, he even sometimes played as a defender) got a partner: on the left - reactive, with a non-standard stroke and excellent scoring Artyom Pugolovkin's flair, and on the right - very young, but with a high hockey intelligence, versatile (completing the attack with an accurate throw or giving a jewelery goal pass is not a problem for him) Zhenya Krutikova.

Eugene in this link, as a rule, played the role of the tip of the attacking red and white spear. And if Pugolovkin, in general, was reluctant to climb a penny, then Krutikov just there felt like a fish in water. Tall, powerful, stubborn, with a good rolling step, Zhenya was not afraid of anyone, fearlessly climbed ahead and often achieved success in close combat. Spartak veterans, constantly present at MHC Spartak matches, said that Zhenya Krutikov reminds them of Valery Kamensky in his playing style.

It is clear that the defenders really do not like it when the attacker plays in this way and they try to immediately indicate that for active actions on their own patch they will "kill". But Eugene was not at all embarrassed by this. He was ready to fight back anyone, just to succeed. Hence - numerous skirmishes at the other's gates and a rather solid penalty time, scored by our hero: in 53 games 58 penalty minutes. But at the same time, at the end of the season, Krutikov had the highest utility in the team - "plus 15" - and the third in terms of performance - 29 points (13 goals and 16 assists). Zhenya also felt confident on the throw-in: he has one of the highest percentage of won throw-ins - 56.8 percent.

Evgeny Krutikov was included in the junior "Red Stars" "for a trip to the prestigious European tournament and Zhenya also played for the West national team in the All-Star Game (players under 18) for the Future Cup. At the same time, it is strange that the coaches of the Russian junior team stubbornly did not pay attention to Krutikov. But, as they say, they know better. After all, they are primarily responsible for the result. Recall that at the recent junior world hockey championship in the Czech Republic, the Russian team took only fifth place.

In early October, MHC Spartak, for various reasons, began to experience serious staffing difficulties, and the three Pugolovkin - Shkenin - Krutikov had to be broken periodically to balance the composition. But even in this situation, Evgeny continued to churn out goals and give

assists. A particularly successful finding of the coaches is his teamwork with Semyon Golikov. In two victorious matches in a row - with the HC MVD in Sokolniki and away with the Chelyabinsk “White Bears” - the guys scored a total of nine scoring points for two, scoring five goals out of six.

The most important thing in Evgeny's game is that no matter what partners he plays with, he is always at the forefront of the attack, ready to fight on the spot, to create constant tension near the opponent's goal. But at the same time, he does not for a second forget about an instant return home in case of a loss of the puck. After the new year, the link in which Yevgeny played, more often looked like this: Pugolovkin - Hatsey - Krutikov. Remembering the old "school" connections, the guys quickly found a common language and had just reached the "design capacity" when that very unpleasant fall of Krutikov happened. At first glance, the shoulder injury, which was not too serious, turned out to be fatal. It seems that the very next day Zhenya, in a special bandage on shoulder joint, looked cheerful enough and was ready to take part in the training, but still the departure on the route Voskresensk - Cherepovets - St. Petersburg passed without him.

However, by the next February away series of games in Yekaterinburg, Magnitogorsk, Tyumen and Khanty-Mansiysk, he was already in the ranks. It seemed that all the hardships and worries were behind, Zhenya's injury did not bother too much, MHC Spartak entered the playoffs ahead of schedule, for the first time in history, and would soon compete for the Kharlamov Cup. But ... in the game with the Ufa "Tolpar", on March 6, Krutikov receives a second blow on his seemingly already healed shoulder and, writhing in pain, leaves the site. The doctors' diagnosis - the shoulder "flew out" completely and an operation is necessary. Such a successful season for Eugene is over. Completed due to injury. The operation on the sore shoulder went well, Evgeny is recovering quickly and promises to be in the most fighting mood by the season.

We wish the young Spartak pupil more than once to play in the playoffs for his native red-white club and be sure to win the Kharlamov Cup.

A quarter of a century ago, Russia was facing the threat of disintegration, and an entire nation was facing the threat of destruction. It was possible to avoid both of them only thanks to blackmail against the President of the Russian Federation. Much of this story will be published for the first time.

Exactly 25 years ago in Sochi, in the Dagomys hotel complex, the so-called Sochi (they are wrong - Dagomys) agreements were signed between the then leaders of Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia and North Ossetia, which stopped the destructive war and created a precedent for the introduction of mixed peacekeeping armed forces into conflict zones in the post-Soviet space. The same text formed the basis for the strategy of "freezing" wars for an indefinite period, which is still causing a lot of controversy.

"Yeltsin was actually given an ultimatum on the secession of North Ossetia from Russia"

The treaty provided, firstly (and most importantly), a ceasefire and the beginning of the withdrawal of troops from the conflict zone. Secondly, the introduction of four-sided peacekeeping forces into South Ossetia (North Ossetia acted as an independent subject of law, although it is part of the Russian Federation). At the same time, a Mixed Control Commission (JCC) was created, which was supposed to monitor the ceasefire and resolve everyday issues on the line of contact. Finally, the parties pledged to begin negotiations on the economic recovery of the region. Subsequently, the Georgian side sabotaged this clause, considering it a "payment of reparations."

For its part, Russia pledged to withdraw from the city of Tskhinval and its environs the helicopter and engineer-sapper regiments deployed there since Soviet times and under Russian jurisdiction (unlike the situation in Ukraine, the units of the Transcaucasian Military District did not swear allegiance to local governments).

Thus, it was a technical agreement on the cessation of hostilities and relative normalization of the situation. Any hints of political or any other discussion of the essence of the conflict - the status of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District, which by that time had already held a referendum on independence (99% voted “for”) and proclaimed the Republic of South Ossetia (RSO) were deliberately removed from the text ... And this regime held out (with a number of reservations) until the 2008 war, when the Russian side announced its de facto termination in connection with the Georgian aggression, but Tbilisi officially denounced the Sochi agreements only in September, when the war had already been lost. At the same time, meetings of representatives of the JCC at the border continue to this day.

The road to the Sochi Accords is a classic spy thriller still waiting for Le Carré or Yulian Semyonov. Until now, there are too many figures of silence in this story - it is not customary to discuss some key events out loud. Now, after a quarter of a century, we will try to get around this "silence of the wolves".

One cartridge - one dollar

By the spring of 1992, the ruling elite in Georgia (Eduard Shevardnadze, Jaba Ioseliani, Tengiz Kitovani, Tengiz Sigua) was able to dramatically increase its military potential due to the equipment of the former Soviet ZakVO, which was either transferred to the Georgian authorities under quotas of an agreement on the division of the Soviet army (for example, this more than 200 tanks), or was bought under corruption schemes, in which some senior officers of the district were also involved, mostly not Russian by nationality. The Russians, on the other hand, fiercely resisted, which led to an armed clash around the garrison of the Gori training tank regiment. The Georgian “informals” who came for the “paid for” weapons were repulsed, but the child of one of the Russian officers, who was playing in the sandbox in front of the headquarters, died. After that, the tank regiment ironed Gori for the day, sparing no one who was in camouflage and spoke Georgian.

By May, the Georgian group on the outskirts of Tskhinvali had turned into an army that was many times superior both in number and in armament to the local militias, who had hardly been brought together into the National Guard and OMON under a relatively unified command. In May, a frontal assault on the city began, which could well have ended with the fall of the capital of the RSO, if not for the massive heroism of the defenders.

Suffice it to recall that in the area of ​​the village of Pris - one of the heights dominating over Tskhinval - Georgian armored vehicles went on the attack in the so-called infantry formation, that is, with a solid wall of metal. Pryce was left with heavy casualties, which could be the beginning of the end for the city. But active resistance continued, and the Georgian army was unable to build on the success. Tbilisi had to completely hire tank crews from among the military personnel of the ZakVo (mainly immigrants from Central Asia), since there were no trained personnel of its own. To start the engine for some criminal from "Mkhedrioni" or a Tbilisi intellectual from the "informal" society of "Elijah the Righteous" was akin to magic. But no one canceled the numerical and fire advantage.

At the same time, South Ossetia did not receive any centralized supply from Russia. Official Moscow generally ignored what was happening, Boris Yeltsin was somehow not up to it, and in the circle of the first president, especially in the specialized divisions for interethnic relations, persons with strange views and a “non-core” past dominated.

The greatest authority in this area among Yeltsin's entourage was enjoyed by Emil Pain, in 1992 an adviser to the Foreign Policy Association, that is, in fact, an employee of Eduard Shevardnadze. His main scientific work by that time was the monograph "Ethno-social factors in the development of rural settlements", published in 1983. At what point and for what merits he became the Kremlin's chief analyst on national policy is still not clear. But it was Pain and his closest aide Arkady Popov signed by Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a very influential at that time, that a voluminous article with a straightforward headline, not even in Brezhnev's but in Stalin's style, was published: “Morally unjustified, legally doubtful, politically ineffective.”

This is about the South Ossetian referendum. According to all the laws of the genre, such a publication was perceived as a guide to action and "the opinion of the top." Subsequently, Pain became deputy head of the Analytical Department of the Presidential Administration, a permanent member of the Presidential Council, which was abolished in 2000, and, ultimately, an adviser to the President of Russia. With the departure of Yeltsin, his political career in the country, thank God, ended, but in many respects he and his Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (CEPRI) are personally responsible for the tragic development of events in South Ossetia, the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia and, ultimately, in Chechnya. ...

The only major Moscow politician who spoke out sharply against the Georgian aggression in South Ossetia in the most difficult period from a military point of view was Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who even promised to bomb Tbilisi. But no one took him seriously, and therefore was not afraid. Something similar happened in Chechnya, when Rutskoi, on his own initiative, went to negotiate with Dzhokhar Dudayev ("like a pilot with a pilot"). The Chechens simply blocked his plane at the Khankala airport, demonstratively humiliating a senior Russian government official for the first time.

It was extremely difficult to reach out to the government. Only once did the Prime Minister and - at the same time - the Commander of the National Guard Oleg Teziev and the author of these lines (then - Teziev's assistant) manage to go to a closed meeting of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation to present the South Ossetian point of view.

Affected my old acquaintance with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who, like Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, attended the meeting, and the help of one of the North Ossetian deputies. But the effect was minimal, since Kozyrev considered what was happening “ internal affairs Georgia ”, and Grachev in a personal conversation after the end of the meeting only joked strangely and brushed aside phrases like“ Yes, I know, blah, where are you taking weapons ”.

Translated from Grachevsky into Russian, it meant "do what you want, but don't drag me in."

At that time, it was possible to find a common language only with some senior officers of the Russian army, united by extreme hostility to many processes that had taken place in the post-Soviet space since the time of Gorbachev. But, taking into account the clearly expressed position of the Minister of Defense (“do what you want, damn it”), there could be no question of any centralized or even more official deliveries of weapons to the defenders of Tskhinval.

Several units of armored vehicles were purchased for cash in Kazakhstan. The 5.45 cartridge cost one dollar, which became for me the daily mantra with which the working day began and ended. Money was formed as a result of complex schemes, as a result of which no one was enriched. But many went broke.

Ossetian as reddish brown

The search for a scenario for stopping the bloodshed, which could become acceptable for Moscow, began somewhat earlier than the situation around Tskhinvali became critical. The information blockade made it impossible to draw the attention of the Russian public to what was happening.

For children and adolescents, it is worth clarifying that "mobile phones" then were black suitcases weighing five to seven kilograms, and when talking in the brain, a "mad calculator" began to click - a minute of conversation in Moscow cost about 10 dollars.

But communication with the blockaded city was not only an economic, but also a technical problem. In the office of the author of these lines in Rybny Lane (now there is a complex of buildings of the presidential administration) there were five government telephones of the famous systems ATS-1, ATS-2 and government long-distance communication, which the Abkhaz also used (they were destined to experience something similar in a year) ... And in the bunker of the parliament building in Tskhinvali, a special room was equipped, where "Iridium" stood - the only communication system with the outside world.

In Moscow, the liberals then dominated almost totally, and they were hostile to South Ossetia. Decisive was the fact that the South Ossetian deputies of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, together with Viktor Alksnis, Yuri Blokhin and Georgy Komarov, became co-founders of the Union deputy group, which advocated the preservation of the USSR. As a result, the label of “red-brown” stuck to the national liberation movement of South Ossetia, as later to the Pridnestrovians.

This is despite the fact that power in Tskhinvali almost since 1989 has actually been in the hands of the Popular Front "Adamon Nykhas" - an informal association of local intelligentsia and youth of non-communist orientation, headed by history teacher Alan Chochiev - the informal leader of the patriotic movement and, in fact, one of the the main creators of South Ossetia.

Even just to enter the White House, you need someone to order a pass. But people like Chubais (there was a way out for him) simply brushed aside. Like, you are fighting against democratic Georgia for the restoration of the empire, there is nothing to talk about with you, go away, Satan.

In such a situation, North Ossetia became the only territory in which a certain concept of an armistice could be invented. She was the only instrument of influence on Moscow. After the publication of the text of Pain and Popov, through the efforts of a large group of people from Moscow and Vladikavkaz, a certain document was prepared, in which the principles that later formed the basis of the Sochi agreements were formulated for the first time. It was published in Moscow in the same "Nezavisimaya Gazeta" under the signatures of Evgeny Krutikov and Alan Kasayev, but, I repeat, many more people participated in its writing.

Subsequently, the principle of cessation of hostilities while removing the political causes of the conflict outside the framework of the current negotiations will be called "freezing the conflict." But the only clear goal at that time was a ceasefire, because the situation threatened to escalate into the physical destruction of the people of South Ossetia, and well-fed wolves and Mingrelians moved there from Samurzakan would wander through the ruins of Tskhinvali.

Strictly speaking, this was the end of the ideological and political preparation of the agreement. Yeltsin's Moscow did not have clear political incentives to intervene in the war, especially given the West's goodwill for Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin's own relatively weak positions within the country. This is despite the fact that diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia did not exist then, and Georgia was not a member of the UN, that is, a recognized subject of international law.

Only something very dangerous for the Russian authorities could push the Kremlin to intervene, even if there was a huge amount of leverage on Tbilisi.

North Ossetia suffered greatly from the consequences of the war over the pass. A stream of Ossetian refugees poured into the republic, and not so much from South Ossetia itself as from the interior regions of Georgia. Many of them spoke only Georgian, had long ago perceived some peculiarities of the Georgian national character, and this greatly irritated the conservative North Ossetian society. The republic suffered huge financial losses, and in some places public opinion was strongly opposed to the authorities.

In the then ruling elite, only a few openly supported the defenders of Tskhinval.

Soltanbek (Sergey) Tabolov, the former secretary of the party republican committee, after 1991, director of the republican Institute for Humanitarian Research, stood out. With his personal participation, the delivery of medicines to the blocked city by helicopters was organized and an informal channel of communication with the leadership of "Adamon Nykhas" was created. It is impossible not to mention his wife Irina, the founder and permanent director of the local news agency Irinform (from the word Iriston - Ossetia), who tried to break the information blockade around the events in the South.

It was under pressure from Tabolov that the Supreme Council of North Ossetia adopted a sensational resolution recognizing the independence of the RSO. Now it looks strange, but in the early 90s the political weight of the subjects of the Federation was incomparably higher. In fact, the front-line North Ossetia began to make foreign policy decisions.

The tragic death of Sergei Tabolov in a car accident subsequently became a terrible blow to all patriotic forces in Ossetia, dramatically weakening their positions. The author of these lines was the last person to see him in Moscow. He drove from our Moscow office of the RSO government to Vnukovo airport, I called his car and escorted him to the door. A few hours later, on the way out of Beslan in the direction of Vladikavkaz, a truck crashed into his car under strange circumstances.

Blood on the road

The situation in North Ossetia was heated to the limit. The tragic resolution of the war in South Ossetia could lead to an uncontrolled wave of refugees and the beginning of a guerrilla war, which would finally destabilize the situation in the already troubled Russian North Caucasus. The terrible massacre, which is now politely called "the events in the Prigorodny District," will happen by the fall, but Moscow received mostly pacifying reports that distorted the situation in a critical region for the entire country.

On May 20, on the bypass road from Tskhinval to Russia (the Georgians then controlled 10 kilometers of the only strategic route, and the Georgian villages located there, bristling with concrete barricades and pillboxes, had to go around three passes for half a day), a Georgian sabotage group shot a column of unarmed refugees from machine guns. This tragedy turned the consciousness of all parties to the conflict and became one of the most terrible crimes against the civilian population of that war. Blood flowed like a river in the truest sense of the word.

The "Zarsky execution" clearly demonstrated that there is no hope for peace and that there is a war of destruction that resembled genocide much more than the mass destruction of Ossetian mountain villages in the summer of 1991 (111 settlements were simply wiped out, sometimes physically - Georgian MTLBU and tractors were demolished at home with buckets).

The author of these lines drove before the ambush at Zarya just a couple of hours before, but the Georgians were clearly not interested in four people in a UAZ with weapons. They needed naked buses with women and children. A 4-year-old boy was hit by seven large-caliber bullets, and a fist could be thrust into the holes in his body. Peaceful negotiations on Georgian terms became impossible.

Five days later, Tskhinvali underwent the largest rocket and mortar attack during the war, killing seven civilians. And on June 6, the Georgian army again attacked the Prissky heights and, with heavy losses knocking out a South Ossetian OMON unit, was able to shoot the city point-blank from dominant positions. It turned out to be Sarajevo, from which there is no way out.

But public opinion exploded on June 9 - less than two weeks before the Sochi Accords were signed.

During the period of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR, the German side undertook to create new garrisons and residential townships for the withdrawn forces on the territory of the USSR. One of these microdistricts on the outskirts of Vladikavkaz was built by Philip Holzman, for which he received the corresponding nickname. Subsequently, the 239th separate reconnaissance battalion, known from the battles of the second campaign in Chechnya and in South Ossetia in 2008, was quartered there. And in early June 1992, refugees from the RSO, driven to despair by the "Zarsky execution" and preparations for the storming of Tskhinvali, organized a rally there, demanding to intervene.

At the same time, on the eighth kilometer of the Vladikavkaz-Beslan route, natives of South Ossetia seized army depots with a large amount of weapons and ammunition. An entire railway echelon with twenty-two 152-mm self-propelled guns 2S3 "Akatsia", which were sent for scheduled repairs, passed under the control of the South Ossetian militia. They were brought in and sent to the side of the Roki tunnel.

The situation got out of control of the leadership of North Ossetia and threatened to escalate into an armed seizure of power in the key federal subject for Moscow in the North Caucasus.

The operation to "steal" howitzers was led by the Prime Minister of the Republic of South Ossetia Oleg Teziev, and many representatives of the republic's Ministry of Defense took part. Moreover, the officers of the Russian Armed Forces from the North Ossetian garrisons openly sympathized with the Tskhinvali people and did not offer any resistance. And even they helped. The same was true of ordinary people who threatened to seize military camps if the army resisted the transfer of weapons to South Ossetia.

In panic, the North Ossetian leadership tried to arrest Teziev, but the head of the republic, Akhsarbek Galazov, was clearly explained what would happen if the unpopular government of the SO tried to use force. And the commander of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, General Savvin, in telephone conversation with the author of these lines he assured: "It's okay, everything will be fine."

Russia is on the verge of collapse

By June 11, the situation in North Ossetia really began to stabilize. The self-propelled guns reached South Ossetia and stood in a row at an elevated position. The shells were only enough for a couple of volleys, but the Georgian command did not know this, and the very fact of the presence of 22 howitzers held back many hotheads in Tbilisi right up to 2004.

But for the leadership of North Ossetia and Moscow, this did not pass without leaving a trace. Further events unfolded at a telegraphic pace and in the spirit of a thriller.

The President of North Ossetia (then, by the way, it was still called the Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic and was the last subject of the Russian Federation with such a title) called Yeltsin in Moscow and said: of the people, expressed at the First All-Ossetian Congress, to declare a united Ossetia and joint forces to fight Georgia. You understand that this could be the beginning of a war between Russia and Georgia. I do not want this, but the leadership of the republic can no longer maintain the situation. I ask for your advice and personal participation in resolving the South Ossetian problem. "

“Tell the people that I am ready to personally take part in solving the problem of South Ossetia. I am traveling to the States and I promise you that upon my return from there I will immediately deal with this. Hold the situation until then, ”Yeltsin replied.

On June 22, without receiving any real support, Galazov again called Yeltsin, who had already returned from Washington. This time, he had much more reason for alarm, and his tone was an order of magnitude harsher:

“Boris Nikolaevich, what I told you about before your trip to the States, the people can do without me. Nobody takes all our words, statements, appeals seriously anymore(italics mine - E.K.). South Ossetia may fall today or tomorrow, and the people will be exterminated. I cannot allow this, so I have to take extreme measures. " In support of these words, North Ossetia unilaterally blocked traffic towards Tbilisi along the Georgian Military Highway and closed the state border.

Yeltsin was actually given an ultimatum on the withdrawal of North Ossetia from Russia and the adoption of a number of independent foreign policy and military decisions. Perhaps this saved the country from disaster.

Yeltsin calls Tbilisi and, in an ultimatum, makes an appointment for Shevardnadze on June 24 in Sochi. For a more vivid confirmation of this demand, Russia, contrary to the opinion of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, is suspending the procedure for diplomatic recognition of Georgia at an unofficial and extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council.

Tbilisi falls into a stupor and thinks for a couple of hours what to do now.

In the midst of events, a small group of Zviadists (supporters of former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia) seized the Tbilisi television center. Shevardnadze is personally present during his assault by units of the National Guard who have remained loyal to him, after which he goes out to the protesters on Rustaveli Avenue and asks the crowd: "Should I go to a meeting with Yeltsin?" "Ki, batono!" ("Yes, sir!") - the crowd chants. With this “mandate of the people”, Shevardnadze flies to Sochi and there he discovers with interest that he has become a persecuted national minority.

Moscow, in fact, insisted on the participation in the negotiations not only of the leadership of South Ossetia (Torez Kulumbekov, Alan Chochiev and Oleg Teziev), whom Tbilisi did not call other than "separatists" and "terrorists", but also the leadership of North Ossetia (Akhsarbek Galazov and Sergei Khetagurov ).

Worse, the peacekeeping forces are now being formed on a four-sided basis, as if North Ossetia is not part of the Russian Federation and an independent party to the conflict (by the way, the flow of volunteers from there to South Ossetia was a rather feeble stream, but honor and praise to these people). And Sergei Shoigu becomes the commander of the peacekeeping forces - then the head of not even a ministry, but the State Committee for Emergency Situations. And what - an emergency. It is called a "war of annihilation".

From Sochi, Shevardnadze flew to Istanbul for a meeting with NATO representatives without visiting Tbilisi. Most of all, he was worried about the Russian veto on Georgia's accession to the UN, and at a press conference at the airport he said something like the following: “The Russian position was constructive, with Yeltsin we agreed to establish diplomatic relations by the end of the month, as well as to lift any blockades against Georgia. ".

This meant the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tbilisi, the lifting of the UN veto and the opening of the Georgian Military Highway by North Ossetia. In Georgia, famine caused by the civil war with the Zviadists began, and supplies from Russia through the only open route became critical.

Instead of an afterword

Memory is selective. It leaves out small, funny details, crowding out critical negativity. You can, for example, recall the story of how long it took for the overweight "man with a non-standard figure" Chochiev to find a suitable suit. At first, he generally refused any suit, except for his usual sportswear.

Or how an English journalist (by the way, the negotiations in Sochi were being prepared in a hurry and went very quickly, so there was little press there) asked, pointing to Oleg Teziev: “Wow, is it Sean Connery like James Bond?”.

During these quarter of a century, a whole generation has grown up that does not even have elementary knowledge about how it was and what it was. Not that 2008 overshadowed the beginning of the 90s, just for a long time the events of those years were hushed up. And even their living witnesses prefer to keep quiet or get off with platitudes.

Hence the modern comments about the "fallibility" of the Dagomys agreements. "Errors" due to the fact that the independence of the Republic of South Ossetia was not spelled out in them in large luminous letters.

Modern maximalists (and in those years - junior schoolchildren) simply do not imagine how monstrous work and willpower managed to stop the bloodshed, which threatened to develop into the destruction of an entire people. And it should be especially emphasized that the guys who were sitting on the front line in the trenches and in the city under fire from all the surrounding heights did tens of times more to establish peace than intelligence and diplomacy. Without their personal and mass heroism, everything else would be meaningless.