Nikita Barinov. TRAINING OF OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL ARMY (myths and reality)

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, then a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This is somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, "gentlemen officers" were portrayed as rich, sleek and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, antipodes of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially pronounced in the movie "Chapaev", where instead of the poorly dressed and trained troops available to Kolchak, Chapaev was opposed by "Kappelites" in pure black-and-white uniforms, advancing in a "psychic" attack in a beautiful formation. Corresponding to the high prosperity, training was also assumed, as a result - a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by the lovers of the Russia We Lost and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply lovers of military history, the praise of the officers often reached the point of absurdity.

in fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And the rather difficult financial situation of the officers played an important role in this. Roughly speaking, the best gymnasium students simply did not want to "pull the strap" in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up for them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov wrote in his memoirs: “It was, of course, difficult for my comrades of the time to understand my decision to go to a military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as I noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With such a score, they usually went to higher technical educational institutions. In the military schools, according to the general idea, there were young people who were weak in theoretical training. At the turn of the 20th century, such an opinion about the commanding staff of the army was quite widespread. "Boris Mikhailovich himself went to the army because"My parents lived very economically, because my younger sister Yulia began to study in Chelyabinsk at the women's gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how to make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: "Why not leave for military service?" Secondary education would make it possible to enter directly into a military school. One could not even dream of studying at a higher technical institution at the expense of his parents for five years. Therefore, for the time being to myself, I firmly decided to go along the military line. »

Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, but in terms of their financial situation, were close to the commoners.

« The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guard was far from a frequent phenomenon. Let's turn to the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data on land ownership are available about 36. Of these, five had such. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, Gen. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the other four, one did not indicate the size of the estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, which had the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry (15 army and two guards), that is, 87 people, 6 people do not have property data. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, of which two had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people had land ownership, or 4.9%.

Let's turn to the regimental commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This accounted for 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of their total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are being considered. " If we compare these figures with those for civilian officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let's turn to the list of civilian officials of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 ranks of the second class, of whom 44 owned land, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, which was 30.8%.

Let us compare the data on the possession of land ownership by the military and civilian ranks of the respective classes. So, we have: ranks of the second class - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is enormous. »

P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes about the financial situation: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobility, consisted of the service nobility and in terms of material status did not differ in any way from the commoners "Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes:"The officer was an outcast of the royal treasury. It is impossible to point to a class of tsarist Russia that is worse off than the officers. The officer received a beggarly salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he was married, eked out a beggarly existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the essentials. »

As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff could not be compared with that of civilian officials. In part, this was due to the fact that the maintenance of officials was much higher than that of the generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division chief was 6,000 rubles, and the governor's salary was from 9,600,000 to 12,600 rubles a year, that is, almost twice as much. "Only the guards lived on a" grand scale ". General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalier Regiment. He notes the enormous "cost" of service in this regiment, which was associated both with the cost of uniform, two especially expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most "expensive" regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a kind of completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was recruited from the best graduates of the schools. To do this, it was necessary to get a "guard point" (more than 10 out of 12). In addition, thanks to a system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average grades, the best cadets went to the guard. On the other hand, there were vacancies in the guard only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to enter the most elite Corps of Pages. Already the fourth in the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoye always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky that he was able to graduate from it as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, severely limited the admission of unborn cadets there. However, this was far from the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to the unspoken, but firmly implemented and noted by many researchers law: the regiment officers must approve the entry into the regiment. Finally, it has already been said about the "property qualification". Thus, in the first place, wealthy, well-born officers turned out to be in the guard. True, they needed to complete the course of schools perfectly, but most of the equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to go to the guards regiment. But the guard was the "forge of personnel" for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have an advantage of 2 ranks over army officers, the rank of lieutenant colonel was also absent there, which further accelerated growth. We're not talking about connections and prestige anymore! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard, moreover, most of the generals who did not have the education of the Academy of the General Staff came from there. For example "in 1914 the army had 36 army corps, 1 guard corps ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had a higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, 2 from the Artillery Academy, 1 each from engineering and law. Thus, 90% had a higher education. The three who did not have higher education were the commander of the Guards Corps, Gen. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th army corps, gen. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian corps, gen. G.E. Berchman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 were in the past, and one (Gen. Bezobrazov) served in the Guards at present. »

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was due solely to the "ability" of the guardsmen. After all, it was they who first of all got to the top positions, without having the education of the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the "Schedule" of 1914, the Russian army included 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadier, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian rifle divisions. Their chiefs were lieutenant generals ... By education: 51 people had a higher military education (46 of them graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, -41 - Military Engineering - 4, Artillery - 1). Thus, 63.2% had a higher education. Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that out of 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. Here the guards advantage was already evident. "As you can see, the" guards advantage "affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to a slightly higher post of the head of the corps? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about the absence of higher education from G.E. Berkhman, and the rest of the generals were just from the guard. Having no higher education, but very rich, Bezobrazov generally commanded the guards corps. Thus, the Guard was a "supplier" of academically uneducated officers to the highest army echelons.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of justice in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, having got into the guard, had much more chances to make a career than those who pulled the strap and sometimes were more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect either the quality of the training of the top commanding staff or the psychological climate. It is known that the army was divided into "castes". As already mentioned, the guardsmen were allocated to a special group, who had significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. So the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was reflected even in jokes: "the handsome one serves in the cavalry, the clever one - in the artillery, the drunkard - in the navy, and the fool - in the infantry." The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the most prestigious was the "aristocratic" cavalry. However, she shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the "courtiers" of the Cavalry and Life Guards Cavalry Regiment, who "fought" for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guard, the so-called. "Petrovskaya brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, there was no equality even here: Preobrazhensky was more noble. In the artillery, the equestrian was considered the elite, but the serf was traditionally considered "outcasts", which pretty much "backfired" in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. It cannot be said, of course, that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in dividing and isolating different types of troops from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then - entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially handed them over. According to Shaposhnikov's data, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition in the year of his admission. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. "1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor general development. Poor style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general indiscipline of the mind. 3) Extremely weak knowledge in the field of history, geography. Insufficient literary education “However, it cannot be said that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have a shadow of the problems mentioned in the document. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from those in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is pretty idealized.

Training at the Academy of the General Staff lasted for two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were passed, while from the military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general subjects ended, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were equestrian lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russian-Japanese war, when the division, during the battles near the Yantai mines, Orlov's division scattered, hitting a high gaoliang, when the chief of staff's horse carried and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander division was wounded. Perhaps this was already superfluous for the positional massacre of the First World War, but to the criticism of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaism of the horse as a way of movement compared to the car introduced in Europe, we note that the Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. To buy it abroad was expensive and rather rash from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant drawbacks. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and, in general, practical skills. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. At the exit, instead of high-class staff workers, theorists turned out, far from always having an idea of ​​how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher in general focused on the will to win.

Another problem was the huge amount of time spent on some completely outdated objects, like the depiction of the terrain in strokes. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write about it with unkind words. ,
Contrary to the well-known myth of the generals' enthusiasm for the French school of Granmaison, élan vitale, 6 Shaposhnikov testifies to sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

In general, the strengths of the regular officers of the tsarist army were fighting spirit, readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness, like talking about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in The Brain of the Army in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of the honor of an officer cost a lot for the regular military. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. It was especially important that the tactics of the German troops were no longer a revelation for them, as for the older commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As noted by A.M. Zayonchkovsky, the disastrous situation with the training of the highest command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff's inattention to the problem: “OhPaying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: it was not uncommon to appoint persons who had spent their entire life after graduating from the academy in an administrative chair to the post of division chief and corps commander. “Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially striking. It came to anecdotes: “in 1905-1906 commander of the Amur military district, gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked with surprise: what kind of weapon is it? "The same author notes:"The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - NB) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what the movement of trains on schedule was. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science did not enjoy the love of our military Denikin echoes them:

"I AM The Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that the commanding staff needed to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many chiefs on their staffs. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the "scientific" baggage that he once carried from a military or cadet school; he could not follow the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to inquire about his knowledge. Any kind of check would be considered offensive ... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for assessing the commander. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable convention of maneuvering actions and our general complacency, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as one wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, was losing its sharpness. »
In addition, the higher echelon officer corps was extremely old. Corps commanders by agedistributed as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of the corps commanders were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the chiefs of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the chiefs of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this after the "purge" carried out by the energetic Minister of War Rediger, however, who quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the attestation commission, which worked under his leadership, was appointed: commanders of the military districts - 6; their assistants - 7; commanders buildings - 34; fortress commandants - 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; chiefs of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; infantry regiment commanders - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat capability of the army, paying much more attention to its form and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of the generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who did not at all correspond to the post of chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Tsar. No less blame rests with the Prime Minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him.That is why he defended the generals who showed talents in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield, against dismissal. Quoting from Polivanov's diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: ““Received from e.v. the journal of the Higher Attestation Commission about the corps commanders; followed by permission to dismiss the gene. Shuttleworth; against the conclusion of the dismissal of the gene. Krause and Novosiltsev - the highest resolution "leave", and against the gene. Adlerberg: "I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt" ". It is well known what blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who was not particularly distinguished on the battlefields in Manchuria, but the "hero" of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, Rennenkampf, as commander of the army that invaded East Prussia.

True, one cannot say that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes “TAnyway, after the Japanese war, the senior command personnel were forced to study. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War appeared for the first time by the highest order: "For the commanders of the troops, establish appropriate classes for the highest command personnel, from unit commanders to corps commanders, inclusive, aimed at the development of military knowledge." This innovation provoked irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in him a reproach of gray hair and undermining authority ... But things went little by little, although at first it was not without friction and even curiosities. "We managed to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery:"Probably never before has military thought worked so intensively as in the years following the Japanese war. They talked, wrote, shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education has increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature has increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new organs. It seems to me that, had it not been for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent upsurge and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even a few months of the test of the world war ... “However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the fighting efficiency of the army. A. A. Svechin writes: “NEven less progress should be noted in relation to the tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of the middle and lower command personnel ».

But this was not enough. It is difficult to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short but very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities. »

There were versions that the vessels were used to determine the onset of earthquakes, the fire-fighting function, and even the use of vessels against demonstrators.

Sarovchanin behaved quite aggressively, insisting on the version of earthquakes. Nikita was given the right to answer the question.

Suppose there were ripples on the water even during a small earthquake, - said Barinov. - It could be seen. And, in this case, to understand that danger threatens and it is time to be saved. And the pedestals for communication with the earth.

And the correct answer was unexpected. The facilitator began to sort out the issue point by point with the team. It turned out that the stone pedestals are hollow inside. And they are needed in order to prevent water from freezing in the cold season. A fire was made under the vessels in the freeze, and the water was not covered with ice.

He asked experts to answer why huge bronze vessels were placed on stone pedestals to store water.

By the way, the Nizhny Novgorod player also defended the players, however, the former. Alexey Likhachev, General Director of Rosatom State Corporation, acted as the team's advocate. Earlier we told how the children's team of Rosatom played in the tournament.

The team also lost the question about the long stuffed toy. It turned out that such toys are placed under the door or on the windowsill so that there are no drafts in the room.

The next question was why the inhabitants of Rome called one of the bridges in English. The connoisseurs decided to take the help of the hall. The club suggested that left-hand traffic was introduced on the bridge, as in England. The answer turned out to be correct and the presenter scolded Konstantin Ruder for the fact that his team was missing the correct versions and absent-mindedness.

The team managed to correctly answer the fourth question.

Nikita Barinov again answered the question with black boxes. He got confused about definitions and boxes. But, nevertheless, he answered correctly.

The next question turned out to be a failure again. It was Barinov who insisted on the answer. The team lost the third point.

Nikita Barinov answered again. He answered incorrectly again, and the team lost one more point.

The team answered the last question only partially and the leader gave her the sixth point at the big request of the defenders. With a creak, but the team became a contender for victory in the spring series ..

Konstantin Ruder's team appeared at the club five years ago. In the first season, she won three victories and reached the final of the year. In the second season, the team made it to the winter streak. Then there was one win and one defeat, two losses and a season suspension. As part of the team: Nikita Barinov, Alexandra Zolotova, Roman Kuzikov, Evgeny Fionov, Ilya Bazhenov.

Nikita Barinov is a handsome and intellectually developed young man. Many of you might have seen him on the What? Where? When". Do you want to know what education Nikita received? How is the personal life of a young connoisseur developing? We will gladly tell you about everything.

Biography: childhood, youth and students

Nikita Barinov was born on October 24, 1987 in the village of Vodovatovo, not far from Pavlovsky Posad (Moscow region). He was brought up in an ordinary family.

At school, our hero studied well. His favorite subjects were physics and chemistry. But the boy considered music and drawing lessons boring and useless.

After receiving secondary education, Nikita Barinov submitted documents to the Moscow State Technical University. Bauman. His choice fell on the Faculty of Special Mechanical Engineering. A talented and self-confident guy easily coped with the exams. As a result, Nikita was enrolled in the required faculty.

Work and increase

In 2010 Barinov graduated from the university. He was presented with a long-awaited diploma. The guy had no problems finding a job. He was promoted to a research engineer at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center (VNIIEF), located in the city of Sarov.

Despite being very busy, Nikita always finds time for her hobbies. The guy loves to play chess, studies military history and goes in for skiing. That's not all. He is a runner and a horizontal bar.

In 2010, the club of intellectual games was just emerging in Sarov, the sports version “What? Where? When?". Nikita Barinov became one of its first participants. Together with the Pobeda team, he went to major tournaments and competitions. Our hero took part in 60 such events.

Participation in the legendary program

To the television club “What? Where? When "Barinov joined the team of the state corporation" Rosatom ". He and five of his colleagues working in the same field were invited to the set of the program. This is an educated and respected person who was appointed captain of the team.

The program with the participation of the Rosatom team was aired on May 25, 2013. Nikita proved to be an extraordinary and self-confident player. He took three questions and answered them correctly. This brought victory to the team. Since then, Barinov has regularly participated in the intellectual show “What? Where? When?". He twice became the owner of the "Crystal Atom". The young connoisseur won the hearts of many TV viewers, especially the female part of the audience.

Nikita Barinov ("What? Where? When?"): Personal life

Our hero is an attractive guy with great career prospects. Many Russian girls dream of such a young man. Moreover, he is not married.

Nikita himself admits that he has practically no free time. Barinov works at research institutes, participates in various tournaments and marathons. Our hero has one character trait that prevents him from approaching a girl on the street and getting to know her. This is natural modesty.

Finally

Now you know where Nikita Barinov was born and studied. "What where When?" - the program that made him famous throughout the country. Let's wish such a wonderful guy intellectual victories and great love!