Good evening, dear readers of the Sprint-Answer website. Today we have September 2, 2017, which means that the popular TV game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" is on the air of Channel One. In this article you can read the review of the game, as well as find out all the answers in today's game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" for 02.09.2017.

The first part of the game involves a polygraph examiner-profiler Sabina Pantus and presenter Dmitry Shepelev . The players chose a fireproof amount of 400,000 rubles.

1. What does a catfish have?

mustache
beard
whiskers
dreadlocks

2. What is another name for a zipper?

boa
snake
crocodile
dragon

3. Who is Kuzya from Tatyana Alexandrova's fairy tale?

water
goblin
banner
brownie

4. Which actress in 2003 unexpectedly gave a name to a musical group?

Cameron Diaz
Uma Thurman
Julia Roberts
Penelope Cruz

5. What repairs does the old house require?

mortgage
capital
savings
funded

6. What is the name of the cut piece of clothing?

yoke
flirtatious
minnow
charmer

7. Which country used the escudo before adopting the euro?

Luxembourg
Belgium
Spain
Portugal

8. Which beetle was sacred to the ancient Egyptians?

May
swimmer
bark beetle
dung beetle

9. What is the name of the central square in Amsterdam where the Royal Palace is located?

amster
ladies
Nieder

10. What color is missing from a classic dart board?

White
Red
blue
green

11. How did the creators of Pobeda initially want to name the car?

"Volga"
"Moscow"
"Motherland"

12. What poet did the hero of the film "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears" call "a very promising guy"?

Evgenia Evtushenko
Robert Rozhdestvensky
Andrei Voznesensky
Bulat Okudzhavu

Unfortunately, the players answered the twelfth question incorrectly, so they left the game "Who wants to be a millionaire?" without a win. In the second part of the TV game took part Evelina Bledans and Ekaterina Gordon . The participants of the game chose a fireproof amount of 400,000 rubles.

1. What do drivers call a car's parking brake?

handbrake
scissor
scissor
outhouse

2. Who in Chukovsky's fairy tale "Cockroach" rode a broomstick?

Street cleaner
toad
witch
Harry Potter

3. What is not included in the package of personal emergency rescue equipment for an air passenger?

seat belts
parachute
oxygen mask
inflatable vest

4. What question is usually not expected to be answered?

to delicate
for the examination
to rhetorical
to a question point-blank

5. What is the bombonniere for?

for jewelry
for cigars
for money
for sweets

6. How did the "Manuals on Shooting" order to store rifles in the guardroom?

in the pyramid
in the tomb
in a sarcophagus
in the mouth of the Sphinx

7. Who did not help the girl in the fairy tale "Geese-swans" by Alexei Tolstoy?

stove
river
Apple tree
Swan geese

8. Which building is not located on Palace Square in St. Petersburg?

Winter Palace
Headquarters of the Guards Corps
Tauride Palace
Main Headquarters

9. What shoes have surfers brought into fashion?

brogues
ugg boots
slip-ons
topsiders

10. What was planted in large numbers in 1942 on the football field of the Moscow Dynamo stadium?

tulips
ate
potato
corn

Unfortunately, the players answered the tenth question incorrectly and left the TV game "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?" September 2, 2017 without a win.

Petrovsky Park has long been considered one of the most beautiful and charming corners of old Moscow. Back in 1828, a square planted with lindens, ash trees and pines was laid out here. Since it was located next to the Petrovsky Travel Palace, it became known as Petrovsky. The huge park was crossed by alleys, one of them was named "Moscow" and gradually became especially loved by the townspeople as a place for quiet family walks.

It was here, at the intersection of "Moscow" and "Teatralnaya" alleys, a little less than 100 years later, it was decided to build the first real stadium - a huge capital structure with tiers of stands encircling the field - such neither in Moscow nor in the Soviet Union at that time did not have! This construction was declared an honorable duty of young Muscovites and at first was kept mainly on the enthusiasm of the sports youth of the capital and the investments of the Dynamo society, which then earned with the help of organized production artels. The main construction tool for a long time was a pick and a shovel, horse-drawn traction was used as the main vehicle, however, the project of architects Arkady Langman and Lazar Cherikover was confidently implemented.

It helped significantly that in August 1927 the construction acquired state significance (Moscow was preparing to hold a mass sports festival dedicated to the first Soviet labor five-year plan) - the pace of work increased, and clear deadlines were set for the completion of construction. By August 1928, three concrete stands were built, the stadium stretched out in the form of a giant horseshoe - with straight North and South stands and the Western one closing them in a semicircle. Centuries-old trees grew on the site of the current East Stand and there were small sports fields and courts. Even in its original form, the building became a grandiose sports facility, in all sports departments of which about two thousand athletes could simultaneously train. It was a huge breakthrough, because the old sports grounds could, at best, serve one hundred or two hundred people at the same time!

The opening of the Dynamo stadium took place on August 17, 1928, simultaneously with the opening of the All-Union Spartakiad, the first football match was the football match between the national teams of the Byelorussian SSR and the workers' clubs of Switzerland. The game was commented by the famous Vadim Sinyavsky, the Belarusian football players won with a score of 6:3.

Meanwhile, the popularity of sports competitions grew, football, Russian hockey attracted more and more spectators, and in the autumn of 1934 the reconstruction of the stadium and the construction of the second stage of the project began. The work was completed by the beginning of 1936 - the East Stand was built, which closed the horseshoe-shaped semicircle of elevations, and an additional lower tier was erected. By the first national football championship, the stadium began to accommodate more than fifty thousand spectators, and on the days of especially interesting competitions, it could accommodate up to eighty thousand people due to the upper platforms, which provided standing places.

Gradually, the stadium became an organic part of Petrovsky Park, Muscovites fell in love with the transformed place of leisure, and the park itself was enriched with many sports grounds for various sports, located around the complex. Not only sports spectacles, but the place itself again became attractive to the townspeople - fans gathered at the stadium to talk about their hobby, young people to kick the ball, go skating, do physical education, people far from sports - just walk along the green alleys, breathe air filled with the scent of trees and flowers. Dynamo has become one of the main symbols of Moscow - both as a champion team, leading its history from the first metropolitan football team, and as a favorite place for a growing city.

On June 19, 1941, a match was held at the Dynamo Stadium, in which the hosts hosted the Stalingrad Tractor. The game ended in a draw, and the championship remained incomplete - the Great Patriotic War began three days later. In the winter of 1942, young spruces were planted on the football field for the purpose of camouflage. As soon as the war rolled back from the central regions of our country, the stadium resumed its activities in the service of sports and football. On July 18, 1944, after a long break, the first official match finally took place - in the Moscow Championship, Dynamo beat fellow countrymen from Torpedo with a score of 3: 2. Soon the country's championships resumed, and the stadium again, as in the old days, again and again witnessed Dynamo triumphs.

In 1977-1979, another major reconstruction took place. The stands and under-tribune rooms were renovated, four structures with powerful floodlights were installed, the bright light of which made it possible to broadcast television in color from the stadium. By the same time, a football and athletics arena, a gym, an artificial ice rink, outdoor pools, a sports and administrative building and a hotel were put into operation on the territory of Petrovsky Park. By the Olympics-80, the Dynamo mecca began to live a new life!

However, the further history of one of the main symbols of Soviet sports was no longer so bright and rosy - the country began to be shaken by crises, football players went to work abroad, Muscovites immersed in everyday worries and political whirlwinds became less and less interested in sports. Applied sports almost completely lost their funding, football was in a fever, throwing money into meaningless spending, the stadium survived as best it could, either organizing a market, or trying to make sports schools self-sustaining. Twenty years of not updated structures dilapidated, leaving no opportunity to do without a major overhaul of the entire facility. And so, on November 22, 2008, in the presence of 24 thousand spectators, the last match was held at the first stadium of the country that ceased to exist. Dynamo defeated Tom, the final score of the match was set by Alexander Kerzhakov with the transfer of the current head coach of the blue and white Dmitry Khokhlov, the sky over the stadium bloomed with fireworks, after which the arena was closed for reconstruction.

Since then, projects have been created and redone many times, developers and responsible persons have changed, deadlines have been announced and re-announced, the five-year period has gradually turned into a decade, the youth Dynamo began to replenish with guys who have never been to the famous stadium, did not serve balls to the masters, did not sit on blue and white stands next to fathers and older brothers, and only now, on the day of the ninetieth anniversary of the great arena, we can seriously hope that this year the transformed giant will open its doors to the fans who have been waiting for this and will once again become the first and unique sports facility in our country , and again, as of old, all of Moscow will stubbornly go to Dynamo, and the townspeople will once again begin to stroll under the canopy of lindens near the Petrovsky Travel Palace, discuss matches of the oldest football club in the capital, breathe the fresh air of the park and be distracted from the bustle of the growing metropolis ...

The construction of the stadium in Petrovsky Park began in 1923 according to the project of architects Alexander Langman and Leonid Cherikover. The stadium originally had the shape of a horseshoe, but already in 1935 the East Stand was built, enclosing the stadium. From that time on, the Dynamo stadium had a capacity of 54,000 spectators and remained the main arena of the country until the opening of the Luzhniki stadium. Today it is the oldest Moscow stadium.

Dynamo became the home arena of the Moscow football club of the same name, the first Dynamo match at the new stadium was held on May 19, 1929. In the USSR, sport was an ideology, not entertainment for spectators. Everyone, young and old, passed sports standards, preparing for work and defense. The whole country knew the names of champions in various sports. Although Dynamo is primarily known as a football stadium, before the war, bicycle and motorcycle races, all-Union championships in athletics and speed skating, and bandy matches were held here.

Dynamo before reconstruction. 1934: https://pastvu.com/p/79123

The facade of the lobby of the Dinamo metro station is decorated with bas-reliefs depicting athletes and athletes

Ticket pavilions of the stadium

During the Great Patriotic War, soldiers were trained at a carefully guarded stadium and OMSBON detachments (a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes) were formed, which were then sent to the enemy rear. Shooters and snipers trained in the shooting gallery, and young spruces were planted on the football field, probably in order to disguise themselves from air scouts.

"Dynamo". 1942-1944: https://pastvu.com/p/1765

"Dynamo". Celebration of the 800th anniversary of Moscow. 1947: https://pastvu.com/p/450639

On June 3, 1945, the first peacetime football match took place at the Dynamo Central Stadium. In the 1950s, football was unrivaled, newsreel footage has been preserved of how huge lines line up at the box office, how crowds of people besiege the gates of the stadium, and how the overcrowded stands emotionally react, following the ups and downs of the match. Then a song appeared on the verses of Lev Oshanin: “But all of Moscow stubbornly goes straight to Dynamo, forgetting about the rain ...”

"Dynamo". 1957: https://pastvu.com/p/65508

In 1964, an electronic light board was installed at the stadium. Before that, banners with the names of the teams were posted on the information towers, and when goals were scored, the giant numbers of the match score were manually changed.

"Dynamo". 1980: https://pastvu.com/p/802807

For the Moscow Olympics, all old sports facilities were reconstructed, in particular, lighting masts appeared at Dynamo, which made it possible to broadcast television in color. As part of the football tournament of the Olympics-80, seven matches were played here. Spectators then sat on more wooden benches, plastic chairs appeared here in 1998, due to which the stadium's capacity was sharply reduced.

The press box is a cult place, Vadim Sinyavsky and Nikolai Ozerov conducted their reports from here.

At the entrance to the North Stand in 1999, a monument was opened to the greatest goalkeeper Lev Yashin, who gained fame in games for the USSR national team, and in club tournaments he defended the colors of Dynamo Moscow.

Football commentator Vasily Utkin

To football

On November 22, 2008, a farewell match was held at the stadium (in a historic match, the capital's Dynamo played with Tomyu), and in 2009 a major reconstruction of the stadium began. Demolition of some buildings is planned, in place of which two new sports complexes, offices, a hotel and a residential complex with class “A” apartments will be erected. Trade areas will be located underground, and a retractable roof will allow Dynamo to hold concerts. After reconstruction, the capacity of the arena will be 45,000 spectators. The author of the project is the Dutchman Eric van Egeraat and the Russian Mikhail Posokhin, head of the Mosproekt-2 Institute. The total area of the sports part will be more than 200 thousand square meters, and the total area of the commercial part will be twice as large - more than 450 thousand square meters. After reconstruction, the stadium will be called "VTB Arena Dynamo Central Stadium" (construction work is being carried out at the expense of investments from this bank).

In the photographs of 2008 - the Dynamo stadium immediately after the farewell match

Three years have passed. The lighting masts were dismantled, the stands were dismantled and the construction site came to a standstill. But at the beginning of February 2012, construction equipment came to the stadium again. According to the plan, already in 2016 the stadium should be ready for football matches, and in 2018 the games of the World Cup will be held here.

... Already our suffering cannot be found
No measure, no name, no comparison.
But we are at the end of a thorny path
And we know that the day of liberation is near.

These lines belong to the Soviet poetess Olga Bergholz, which during the Great Patriotic War remained in besieged Leningrad.

The day of liberation came a few years after this poem was written. Exactly 73 years ago, Leningrad was finally liberated from the blockade.

Hope and Football

... It was 1942. Leningrad residents survived the first blockade winter, which turned out to be quite severe: it happened that the temperature dropped to minus 32,

and there was no heating in the houses, sewerage and water supply did not work. Back in April, snow cover in some places reached 52 centimeters, and the air remained cold until mid-May.

But in the hearts of people, despite hunger, cold and shells exploding around, there was something that helped them live on - hope. Hope the city survives. No matter what. They tried to maintain this spark in their souls in various ways: someone wrote poems and poems, someone composed music. And there were those who played football.

It is surprising how, in the conditions of a besieged city, someone came up with the idea to hold a football match, but on May 6, 1942, the Leningrad City Executive Committee decided: there must be a game!

Club archive. 1942 blockade match

Gathering the players was not easy: many of the players fought, and those who worked in the city were so exhausted that they would hardly have run even a few tens of meters. By some miracle, the teams still scored: a goalkeeper was called from Nevsky Piglet Viktor Nabutov, from the Karelian Isthmus - Dmitry Fedorov, were withdrawn and Boris Oreshkin, Mikhail Atyushin, Valentin Fedorov, Georgy Moskovtsev, and other blockade players. Dynamo resembled the team that was before the war, but the team of the Metal Plant, against which they played, consisted of those who at least somehow knew how to play and were able to run around the field.

Initially, the match was supposed to take place at the Dynamo stadium, but the main field was so damaged by falling shells that the game was moved to a reserve field next door. Everything was like in an ordinary championship match: the teams and uniforms were obtained, the referee was invited (the referee of the all-Union category P.P. Pavlov worked at the game), even the fans were found.

It was hard to play. It is clear that this was completely different from modern football: most of the players were exhausted, so they often felt dizzy and short of breath. In the interval between half-hour halves, none of them sat on the grass - otherwise they would not have been able to get up later.

The Germans, having heard the broadcast of the game on the radio, decided to disrupt the match, so at the beginning of the second half, the stadium area was fired upon, and one of the shells fell into the corner of the field. All the players and spectators immediately went to the bomb shelter, but after the shelling the match resumed and eventually ended in a victory for Dynamo with a score of 6:0. The players left the field hugging each other.

After this game, several more matches of the same teams took place in the besieged city - on June 30 and July 7, 1942.

The city, which the Germans considered dead, was alive.

impossible to forget

In 1991, a memorial plaque was installed on one of the walls of the stadium: “Here, at the Dynamo stadium, on the most difficult days of the blockade on May 31, 1942, the Leningrad Dynamo played a historical blockade match with the team of the Metal Plant.”

The last participant of those matches, Evgeny Ulitin, died in 2002.

The story of military intelligence's catastrophic failures John Hughes-Wilson

6. STUPID OPERATION. Dieppe (1942)

6. STUPID OPERATION. Dieppe (1942)

On August 19, 1942, forces from the 2nd Canadian Division, based in Sussex, England, landed at Dieppe, a small port city on the north coast of France. The landings were made just after sunrise with 30 new Churchill heavy infantry support tanks. Five hours later, the defeated raiders retreated, having suffered heavy losses: out of 5,000 people who were part of the landing force, 2,700 were killed, wounded or captured. Since only 4,000 fighters landed, this meant a loss of 60%, which exceeded the saddest "record" at that time, achieved on the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916. The Germans were amazed at the stupidity and recklessness of their opponents. One German commentator wrote: "This adventure was contrary to all the rules of military strategy and logic." The Dieppe operation has acquired numerous myths and secrets.

For a number of Canadian nationalists, Dieppe became one of the key myths, according to which the brave Canadian soldiers were sent to certain death by hard-hearted and incompetent British generals. In the eyes of the British public, this was a sacrificial political gesture to convince Stalin that the British Empire was really trying to take some of the pressure off the USSR by opening a second front; Conspiracy theorists regard Dieppe as nothing less than a cunning British plot designed to prove to American strategists in Washington, who in 1942 still knew nothing about European wars and demanded decisive action against the Nazis, that any premature offensive across the English Channel would inevitably end. bloody defeat.

Each of these interpretations contains some truth - but none is exhaustive. For in one very important respect Dieppe is unique: it was the only major offensive undertaken by the imperial armed forces without the official sanction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was the only major Allied operational decision throughout World War II that was not documented. This is the secret that gave rise to all the myths about Dieppe.

A careful analysis of the evidence gives every reason to assume that the Dieppe operation was informal nature and was carried out without the consent of the relevant authorities. The assault on Dieppe was undertaken without adequate resources, lacking intelligence on many key aspects of the German defence, and finally without the full support of the British command, which was often kept in the dark or simply ignored. Worse, the developers of the operation, on principle, did not begin to warn the official intelligence agencies about the impending landing and did not request the necessary intelligence information from them. As a result, intelligence turned out to be the weakest point of the operation.

It may seem strange that a certain military leader took the risk of storming the “fortress of Europe” occupied by the Wehrmacht without an official order, but the personality, ambitions, and track record of the person responsible for the Dieppe operation, Lord Mountbatten, were strange. At the end of 1941, Captain Lord Mountbatten was transferred from his command of a Royal Navy ship to head of joint operations, reporting to Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the General Staff. By March 1942, Mountbatten was promoted at once by three titles becoming the youngest Vice Admiral in the history of the British Navy.

Mountbatten had three main things to be proud of. He proved to be a valiant destroyer captain - his last three ships were put out of action under circumstances that, in the opinion of his many critics, only testified to his recklessness and inexperience. Secondly, he was a specialist in self-promotion, presenting himself as a young and daring hero, capable of repelling the Germans and brightening up the bitterness of defeat for the British. Finally, Mountbatten had huge connections. Cousin of the King, confidant of the Prime Minister, personal friend of Noël Coward, able to easily enlist the support of friends from Hollywood and the British establishment, Mountbatten was a bright spot in the gloomy military panorama of British life in early 1942. There was even talk among Conservative politicians (almost certainly initiated by Mountbatten himself) that he should be given powers that would elevate him above other General Staff officers.

Behind the carefully cultivated legend of Mountbatten hid the unscrupulousness and ambition that often accompany great men and their success. He did not hesitate to deceive during naval exercises in order to distinguish himself from other officers, and deliberately withheld or falsified military records after the war when he felt that his carefully cultivated historical image was in danger. Even his official the biographer saw fit to mention that Mauntbatten was inclined to "rewrite history with arrogant indifference to facts".

Mountbatten's vanity knew no bounds. At the height of the hostilities, he could be seen posing for the camera on the set of Where We Serve, a hagiographic propaganda film based on his personal experience, in which his close friend Noel Coward played the dashing destroyer captain. Here is what Mountbatten wrote to Coward in this regard after the Dieppe raid: “Your letter caught me on my busiest day ... but since the matter ... is urgent, I will first solve it, and then I will take up my official duties.” A normal commander in his place would visit the wounded and dying and listen to the reports of the survivors.

Beaverbrook himself, knowing that Mountbatten did not tolerate any attacks on his reputation, carefully created by himself, warned during the war: "Do not trust Mountbatten with any responsible positions." Despite Beaverbrook's warnings, the young, unprincipled, vain and ambitious aristocrat was given a seat on the country's highest military council, as well as the resources and power to attack the German-occupied coast of Europe. Mountbatten's character, combined with his newfound power and ambition, led to tragic consequences.

The Dieppe Raid of 1942 had a historical predecessor: the raid on Zeebrugge on Saint George's Day in 1918. Under the command of Admiral Roger Keyes of the Dover Patrol, a sabotage group consisting of warships, marines and soldiers stormed German submarine hangars on the Belgian coast in a desperate attempt to prevent the boats of the Kaiser fleet from going to sea. The raid was partially successful and, despite heavy casualties, lifted British morale, which had been shaken by the last German ground offensive of the First World War. The raid on Zeebrugge was touted as an example of a brilliant military operation that inflicted serious damage on the enemy at the cost of little blood - it was this kind of indirect attack that for many years was a favorite technique of British strategists.

In 1940, Keyes reappeared on the scene of hostilities, this time as Chief of the Joint Operations Staff, tasked with attacking the victorious Germans on the shores of Europe and repeating his 1918 success. It is difficult to say what prompted the British to attack the defended positions on the European coast - the Germans never felt the need to undertake such a military adventure on the coast of Britain. Be that as it may, in 1940 the new Prime Minister Churchill decided that, despite the expulsion of British troops from the continent, it was necessary to continue the offensive strategy - not only to inflict damage on the Germans, but also to encourage the suffering population of occupied Europe, who in 1941 there was no other hope for release. Apart from aerial bombardment, the offensive was the only chance.

The Joint Operations Headquarters was an unusual structure. It was an experimental headquarters for the coordination and planning of military operations, created with the aim of pooling the resources of the three branches of the armed forces. When Mountbatten succeeded Keyes in 1941 by direct order of Winston Churchill, his task, in Mountbatten's own words, was to "continue to carry out the raids so brilliantly launched by Neese, in order to maintain the offensive spirit ... Secondly, to prepare for the invasion to Europe, without which we will never win this war." In addition, according to Mountbatten, Churchill said: "I want you to turn the south coast of England from a defensive bulwark into a springboard for attack."

It was a dizzying rise for a recent 41-year-old shipmaster whose dream was to command one of the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers. But Churchill, in his choice and appointment to the high office of the reckless Mountbatten, was guided primarily by political considerations: the Prime Minister wanted to demonstrate to the Americans, who had just entered the war and were skeptical about the combat potential of their ally, the offensive spirit of the British troops. After defeats in Norway, France, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete, Malaya and Singapore, after Rommel's victories in North Africa, culminating in the surrender of Tobruk in June 1942, the Americans had every reason to regard the combat effectiveness of the British army as low. Even Churchill could not understand why surrender followed surrender, often repeating bitterly, "Why don't our soldiers want to fight?"

Churchill made a good choice. Being aware of the charm of Mountbatten, his attractive appearance, remembering the impression desperate thugs, what he did on the Roosevelts, especially on Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the cunning prime minister understood that if anyone could convince high-ranking American politicians of the strength of the fighting spirit of the British, it was Mountbatten. During his visits to Washington, the new commander of joint operations won the hearts of every American he met, including the living personification of Republican military prowess and America's greatest soldier, General George W. Marshall, who became his personal friend. The young hero did a great job in the field of diplomatic "PR", this time using his brilliant abilities not only for his own benefit, but also in the interests of his compatriots. Churchill was rightly proud of his protégé. Mountbatten himself seemed to be well aware of Churchill's true intentions, boasting to one of his friends: "Winston has told me what he wants, and now I must put his plans into practice." With such powerful support, it would be difficult for even the most modest person not to acquire megalomania, and Mountbatten never suffered from excessive modesty. According to the Canadian historian and expert on Dieppe, Professor Brian Loring Villa, "If Mountbatten's head was spinning, Churchill was most to blame." If you wish, you can even consider Mountbatten as sacrifice unscrupulous Churchill, who played on the weaknesses of the young admiral for his own purposes.

After the departure of Keyes, Mountbatten wasted no time in establishing his own order in the Joint Operations Headquarters and at the same time reaping the fruits of the success of his predecessor. The headquarters was bathed in glory thanks to successful raids on the Norwegian islands of Vogsoy and the first military distinction of the Parachute Regiment - the daring theft of a German radar installation from the city of Bruneval in northern France. Even the raid on St. Nazaire on March 27, 1942, despite the losses, was considered successful (five awarded the Victoria Cross), since during it a huge dry dock was destroyed (the only one capable of servicing German warships in the Atlantic), which solved one of the big strategic problems for the British. All these operations were developed by the headquarters at the time when Keyes led it.

Mountbatten's new plans for 1942 of the Joint Operations Headquarters included a vast list of attacks, from the temporary capture of Alderney, one of the Channel Islands in the English Channel, to a reckless raid on the Gestapo headquarters in Paris. The raid on Dieppe in June, code-named "Locia", was supposed to be the crown number. (Rutter). The goals of the Dieppe operation, despite later claims that it was an unsuccessful attempt at a large-scale invasion of Europe or some kind of deception to disorientate the Germans and support the French Resistance fighters, were actually as follows: to check whether it was possible to capture and hold a major port in for a limited period of time; obtain intelligence from prisoners, as well as seize documents and equipment; evaluate the reaction of the Germans to a major "false" attack on the French coast.

In addition to these purely military objectives, three other less clearly defined objectives were set. First, the Air Force headquarters wanted to engage the Luftwaffe in the West in a massive air battle and inflict serious damage on the German air force based in France; the second, purely political goal: to demonstrate to the USSR that Britain was determined to take the Germans by the throat; third, and the most obscure of all: the desire of the Canadian government to take a more active part in the war.

The first of these subsequently played into the hands of Mountbatgen. Although the Royal Navy and Army were wary of committing too many forces to Operation Pilot, Chief of the Air Staff Marshal Portal was keenly interested in demonstrating the power of the rapidly growing fighter fleet in 1942 and engaging the German Air Force in the fighting in the hope of inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans. . The action to destroy ground targets in the port, located at a close distance from the airfields of southern England, was supposed to "cause a backlash from the Luftwaffe." As a result, the RAF became a staunch supporter of the plan, while the other two branches of the armed forces were rather cool about it.

Churchill's political difficulties in the spring and summer of 1942 were largely due to his support for Operation Pilot in particular and the activities of the Joint Operations Headquarters in general. Any British victory in the West would be an important trump card in the complex political game between the allies. The need for decisive action became even more evident after Stalin's speech in February 1942, in which he dropped an indirect allusion to the possibility of a separate peace with Hitler. From the point of view of the seriously alarmed British Foreign Office, this speech could be either the first step towards a truce, or an attempt to shift a significant part of the burden of the war onto the shoulders of the British in order to lighten the burden on the Russians. In any case, it was necessary to convince the USSR that Great Britain was determined to fight. Large-scale offensives in the West would confirm this determination, regardless of their outcome.

The summer began under the sign of embarrassing defeats in the desert and British dissatisfaction with the actions of their prime minister. Churchill became increasingly depressed and desperate for success - any success. With the fall of Tobruk on 21 June 1942, the political volcano in Westminster and Whitehall threw up a lava of dissatisfaction with Churchill's wartime leadership: the Prime Minister and his government were subjected to fierce criticism in political circles and the press. A no-confidence vote was passed in the House of Commons, and although its outcome (obviously orchestrated) was in favor of Churchill (475 votes to 25), the prime minister experienced a severe shock. He later confessed that "the only thing he ever feared was the House of Commons in the midst of debate."

To survive as a politician, Churchill needed military success. And he knew it. Now he had to wage a political struggle not only with the Germans and his strategic allies Roosevelt and Stalin, but also with a skeptical parliament and Whitehall. Cautious and pragmatic chiefs of staff considered most of his military adventures premature, content with the gradual build-up of British military power. Churchill, a politician who understood perfectly well that in a democracy one should appease the crowd, needed some momentary success. Only the bomber force under the cocky Harris and the Joint Operations Headquarters, led by the desperate Lord Louis Mountbatten, shared his values and were ready to face off against the enemy in the summer of 1942.

The third objective of Operation Lotia was the least practical of all. It consisted in the desire of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, after two and a half years of inactivity, to take part in the battles. From the start of the war, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King had publicly voiced strong support for Canada's entry into the war, but was slow to send her troops to the front. Given the aggressiveness and traditionally high morale of the Canadians, such a policy was inevitably doomed to failure. Despite the fact that thousands of Canadians signed up to volunteer, Mackenzie King understood that conscription for overseas service would lead to political problems, especially in French-speaking Canada, and did everything to keep Canada's participation in the fighting on the front lines to a minimum.

Divisions were growing among politicians in Ottawa. Having created a large, well-trained and well-equipped army and sent it to the English county of Sussex to prepare for battle, Canadian politicians found that their war machine began to work on its own. The commanders of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in England, McNaughton, Crearar and Roberts, tired of two years of inactivity, were looking for an opportunity to take a more active part in the war, if only to give their bored soldiers something to do. As usual, boredom manifested itself in the fall of discipline. Canadians stole, drank, fought and had promiscuity, which is natural for any large group of healthy young people who are away from home and do not know what to do, but surrounded by many available single women.

The Canadian propaganda machine tried in vain to convince the public that the crime rate in the Canadian army was no higher than in others. By August 1942, 3,238 Canadian soldiers had been court martialed in Sussex, and fed up with their antics, the locals hoped that the fighting would soon divert the attention of their overly glib guests to other things. Lord Woof Woof mockingly prophesied from Berlin: “If you want to occupy Berlin, give every Canadian soldier a motorcycle and a bottle of whiskey. Then declare Berlin closed to the public. Canadian soldiers will be there in 48 hours and the war will be over.” In 1942, the Canadian army in Britain was the most trained but the least combatant. The Canadians and their commanders were eager to fight. When Lieutenant General Harry Crearar, commander of the 1st Canadian Corps, was called to the headquarters of Montgomery, Chief of the South East Command, on April 27, 1942, he was asked if Canadian soldiers were ready to take part in a large raid on the French coast. The answer was short: “Sure!”

On May 13, 1942, the chiefs of staff approved the plan for Operation Lotsia. The plan called for a frontal offensive along the entire coast of Dieppe, supported by flank attacks by commandos in order to destroy coastal batteries covering the approaches to the port. A thousand sorties were planned to take control of the airspace and ensure complete air superiority. The navy was supposed to bombard the city from the coastal zone. The plan "Lotsia" could not be called successful. In the last stages of planning, attacking forces had to be significantly reduced, as the navy refused to provide battleships and other large vessels for fire support, and the Air Force, in order to avoid losses among French civilians, reduced plans for an intensive bombardment of the Dieppe coastline to a series of fighter-bomber raids and strafing attacks. The 2nd Canadian Division was to lead the offensive and temporarily capture the radar station and airfield at the city of Ark, five kilometers from the coast.

On July 5 and 6, Canadian troops boarded landing craft, but the weather began to deteriorate and they were ordered to remain at anchor. While the soldiers were seasick in the cramped landing barges, two German bombers appeared in the skies over the Isle of Wight and bombarded the flotilla - without significant results. The strong wind over the Channel did not let up, and on July 7 the operation was canceled, and the soldiers landed, flooding the pubs and streets of the cities of southern England, where they talked about the failed raid and the horrors they experienced in cramped landing barges during the storm. Everyone believed that the Dieppe operation had failed and now would never take place.

It looked like the truth. Neither the commander of the army, Montgomery, nor the commander of the fleet at Portsmouth, Sir William James, believed in the feasibility of the plan. The further the development of Operation Pilot progressed, the greater their fears became. Montgomery, as commander of the army, did not like the idea of a frontal offensive by infantry without proper bombing by Air Force planes in order to weaken the enemy, and the head of bomber aviation was not ready for such an operation. Bernard Law Montgomery fought in the First World War and understood perfectly well that a poorly prepared frontal offensive without proper fire support was doomed to failure.

In turn, the commander of the Royal Navy in Portsmouth and the admiral, who was at the head of the amphibious forces, remembered well the fate of the British Navy ships Prince of Wales and Ripalo, sunk six months ago in Malaya. They were not going to risk their battleships by allowing them to get more than five miles closer to the enemy-occupied coast, where they could easily be bombarded by the German air force. The first sea lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, was in full agreement with them. The professional military understood that the raid on Dieppe was poorly thought out, not provided with adequate fire support and not coordinated. Now that the operation had failed, they all breathed a sigh of relief.

What followed the cancellation of Operation Locia marked the beginning of the Dieppe mystery. The cancellation of the long-cherished plan brought public attention to its developers. Having taken on the fire of criticism both for the overly bloated structure of the Joint Operations Headquarters and for the "botched" planning of Operation Pilot, Mountbatten decided to act independently: on July 8 and 11, he held meetings of the main headquarters involved in the planning of the initial operation, and turned to them for support in organizing a new raid. However, he was refused.

During the second meeting, on July 11, Mountbatten quietly asked several of his supporters to stay after the main critics of his plan (such as Rear Admiral Bailey-Gromann, appointed commander of the fleet forces in Operation Pilot) left the premises. No one knows exactly what happened at the private meeting that followed, but after that, Mountbatten and his senior staff officer, Navy Captain John Hughes-Hallett, immediately set about developing a new operation to replace the Lotion. It will be called "Jubilee", and its target will again be Dieppe.

Any major operation involving an attack on the European continent required the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In July, one of the most curious episodes in the history of the Second World War occurred: the Chief of the Joint Operations Staff, protégé of the Prime Minister and darling of the media, Lord Louis Mountbatten, set out to fool the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the apparatus that coordinated the actions of the intelligence services that command armed forces and most of the officers of their own staff. Mountbatten decided to launch a new attack on Dieppe under a different name and without official approval from his superiors. In his declining years in a little-known TV interview air force 1972, he noted: "I made the unusual and, I believe, quite a bold decision to try once more to storm Dieppe."

Even Captain Hughes-Hallett, Mountbatten's closest officer and staunch supporter of his plan for a new attack on Dieppe, was troubled by the lack of approval from above. He emphasized that, as a senior officer of the Joint Operations Headquarters, he would need to refer to the instructions of some official authority in all headquarters documents and written requests. In this regard, on July 17, the Chief of the Joint Operations Staff sent a formal request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the adoption of the following resolution: "The Chief of the Joint Operations Staff is instructed to organize a new emergency operation to replace the "Lotsia" ... using the same troops." The chiefs of staff began to doubt, and the resolution was not included in the minutes of the meeting.

Mountbatten grew increasingly impatient. On July 25 and 26, he sent new requests to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this time asking for unlimited authority to carry out large-scale raids without having to specify the targets of offensives each time. Envying Mountbatten's rapid rise and privileged access to the top, and extremely suspicious of his ambitions and motives, the chiefs of staff did not meet him halfway. On July 27, they passed a resolution slightly expanding his planning powers, but emphasizing the need for official permission to organize any new operation.

Mountbatten did not expect more. He was glad that he had the opportunity to do something and gave the order to Captain Hughes-Hallett and several trusted officers of his staff to immediately get down to business. It is not known what he said to Hughes-Hallett, but there is little doubt that he deceived him. Perhaps he presented the case in such a way that the resolution of July 27, which expanded his authority in planning, actually implied the agreement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a new plan called "Jubilee". Hughes-Hallett was his faithful ally and sincerely believed everything that his charismatic boss, who was in close contact with prime ministers, movie stars and chiefs of staff, said. For a senior staff officer, such an attitude towards his superior was quite natural.

On July 28, for the information of a limited circle of officers of the Joint Operations Headquarters, an order was issued to resume Operation Pilot under the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and under the code name "Jubilee". On July 31, the headquarters of the sabotage forces received new operational orders, and all parties involved urgently began planning a second operation. On August 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to planning a new raid instead of the canceled "Lotsiya". Dieppe as the target of the operation was not mentioned or discussed.

To the end of his days, Mountbatten referred to these broadly formulated decisions to give the impression that his second raid on Dieppe had been officially approved. However, neither the testimonies of his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the cabinet documents say a word in favor of this version. Even Churchill could not remember the decisions regarding the raid on Dieppe when he was working on his own history of the war, The Noose of Fate, in 1950. In the end, seeing no other way out, he accepted Mountbatten's interpretation and took responsibility, but we know from his correspondence that Churchill did so solely because neither he nor anyone else could find any government documents. , which would indicate the opposite.

The truth is that there was simply no special approval for a new attack on Dieppe, and Mountbatten was well aware of this. He solved the problem with the troops by advising the Canadian military leaders to keep the details of the new operation under wraps "in the interest of security". A limited number of staff officers began planning Operation Jubilee in the strictest secrecy. But not everyone was informed. Under the guise of "security" (that priceless mantra of the military trying to hide the unpleasant truth), several key departments were deliberately kept in the dark. The intractable Admiral of the Fleet, Bailey-Gromann, was not included among the initiates, and at Mountbatten's request, Captain Hughes-Hallett took over his duties. Bypassing Montgomery's headquarters, Ma-untbatten secretly kept in touch directly with the senior commanders of the Canadian army. Most dangerous of all, neither Mountbatten's own chief of staff, nor the high-ranking intelligence liaison officer, nor his official deputy, Major General Haydon, were informed of the new plan for the raid on Dieppe. In the realm of commerce, this would be tantamount to the fact that the chairman of the board of the UK branch of the company Ford decided to produce a new car model in the UK and would not inform the company's US headquarters, the company's sales and marketing director, or its financial director about this. One can only guess how Mountbatten was going to get out of this situation. Most likely, he was betting on the success of the raid, knowing that "the winners are not judged."

The real danger to the renewed operation lay in the field of intelligence. Although it is impossible to keep a secret for a long time about the logistics of any upcoming military operation, it is by no means always possible to determine from them location operations. When it comes to information support, the secret inevitably emerges: Mountbetten needed maps, plans, photographs and other information about Dieppe. Mountbatten's secret plans were threatened by two dangers: he had to keep his revised operational plan secret not only from the Germans, but also, if possible, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task seemed almost impossible, but Mountbatten badly needed intelligence - a lot of intelligence - to organize a successful offensive against a protected port in occupied Europe.

The British have for years demonstrated mastery in leading and coordinating intelligence operations at the highest level. Learning from their mistakes and experience, by the end of 1941 they had perfected the fundamental principle: all operations notify the Interagency Security Council (Inter-Services Security Board - ISSB). The purpose of such a bureaucratic measure was simple, but extremely important: ISSB was the coordinating center of measures to mislead the enemy and, in particular, coordinated the activities LCS- the British Secret Service, whose activities are described in chapter 2. In addition, ISSB ensured the security of operations: only it knew which of the secrets leaked to the Germans in the course of various counterintelligence and diversion operations were genuine and which were fake, only it could assess the overall degree of risk that threatened the security of a particular operation.

Mountbatten chose not to inform the Inter-Services Security Council about Operation Jubilee. The official work "British intelligence during the Second World War" does not say a word about this. Moreover, Mountbatten did not turn to any of the leading intelligence organizations such as the Secret Intelligence Service (SJS) for help, relying on intelligence gathered for Operation Pilot. He updated this basic information with a series of low-level reconnaissance missions assigned to tactical aerial photographic reconnaissance squads and special small communications units that could be called directly without having to answer uncomfortable questions.

This neglect of intelligence was fraught with serious dangers. First, Mountbatten risked being left without the latest intelligence after his troops landed. Secondly, he was deprived of the opportunity to find out how the Germans were aware of his plans. Dieppe had by then been seriously discredited as a target. Six thousand soldiers had been talking about the canceled July 7 raid by the Locia across southern England from the day they landed from the landing craft. Who could stop them? For them, it was history. Everything connected with the raid on Dieppe has long ceased to be a secret. And on top of all the trouble LCS(about which Mountbatten knew almost nothing) was busy relaying carefully selected bits of information about old raid on Dieppe to their "colleagues" from the German intelligence services. With the abolition of "Lotsiya" it was possible to supply the enemy with more or less valuable information about this operation without fear in order to increase his confidence in the agents МІ5, embedded in the Abwehr.

German intelligence disinformation operation conducted by the British "Double Cross" committee using recruited agents МІ5, in the summer of 1942 bore fruit. The German intelligence service received at least four warnings about the Dieppe raid from their alleged agents in the UK. Thus, the Germans were excellently informed. So much so that some commentators seriously believed that the second Dieppe operation was a deceitful maneuver undertaken at the cost of great bloodshed for the sole purpose of strengthening the reputation of agents МІ5 in Abwehr. This version is clearly far-fetched. The most likely explanation is that the Interdepartmental Security Council gave permission for the transfer of minor secrets to the Abwehr after the cancellation of "Lotsia". The only problem was that the secrets were not insignificant: Dieppe was indeed going to be attacked, but Mountbatten chose not to inform the Inter-Services Security Council about the resumption of the operation. Mountbatgen's troops were at great risk.

As is often the case in war, everything was decided by chance - the German intelligence service in Paris did not convey their warnings to the troops defending Dieppe. Although on August 17 and 18, 1942, a drill was declared on the French coast, and Hitler and the German commander in the West, von Rundstedt, warned of possible raids on the French coast, there is no evidence that all this had to do with a specific attack in the area. Dieppe. There is no evidence that the Germans received reinforcements and prepared an ambush for the Canadians. But neither Mountbatgen's intelligence nor Canadian intelligence could know this. Mountbatten was lucky.

The reconnaissance tasks in preparation for Operation Jubilee were relatively simple. To attack a defended coast, operational headquarters must have four types of information: the topography of the battlefield (the steepness of the coastline, the direction of currents, etc.); data on the number and deployment of enemy troops; data on guns, their location and potential; and finally, information about the enemy's response plans - to fight, wait for reinforcements or retreat.

In theory, all this seems easy, but obtaining such information requires access to the entire "pantheon" of intelligence sources and agencies. For example, information about the coastline can be found in books published before the war, but since time and tides inevitably make their own adjustments, it is important that reconnaissance divers carefully recheck the topography of the coast as close to the start of the raid as possible. Information about the number, disposition and morale of the enemy can be collected piece by piece with the help of aerial photographic reconnaissance, agent reports, electronic intelligence and from publicly available sources. It is more difficult to collect information about enemy guns and ammunition depots: after revealing their location by means of aerial photographic reconnaissance, information from local agents or prisoners of war or electronic intelligence data is required to specify the images obtained. Finally, the plans and intentions of the enemy can only be learned from the reports of agents, captured documents, and electronic intelligence data.

The fact is that in order to conduct a successful operation of such a scale as the Dieppe raid, the entire huge arsenal of information gathering tools available to British intelligence was needed. He was available and could answer any questions, but if Mountbatten had turned to the Joint Intelligence Committee for full information support of the raid (Joint Intelligence Committee - JIC) Great Britain, he would certainly have warned the Cabinet Office and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his intention to resume the raid, and they would have stopped him. Therefore, deciding to bypass the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mountbatten was forced to bypass the intelligence agencies.

By ignoring the intelligence community, Mountbatten risked leaving his troops in the dark about vital information. The fact that he did not use all available sources of intelligence led to senseless losses. Here are two simple but convincing examples: the coast at Dieppe turned out to be too steep and rocky for tanks with lightweight tracks; secondly, artillery pieces were hidden in coastal grottoes. On the day of the operation, ignorance of these two facts would have killed many Canadians. Both problems could easily be solved by the Joint Intelligence Committee with the intelligence at its disposal, but Mountbatten did not dare to turn to an outside higher agency for help. He wanted to keep his desire for personal glory secret.

Some of the other intelligence errors in Dieppe bordered on farce. According to data obtained by the intelligence department of the Joint Operations Headquarters - and military intelligence - the Dieppe area was defended by the 110th division of the Wehrmacht. Of course, the soldiers of the 110th division would have been glad to be there, but it was impossible: in those days they wearily wandered through Russia, almost four thousand kilometers from the scene, chasing Soviet soldiers retreating to the east in the endless steppe.

In fact, the military unit that enjoyed the delicious wine and French girls in Dieppe was the 571st Infantry Regiment of the 302nd Division, a second category division made up mostly of middle-aged Poles and ethnic Germans and equipped with a mixed bag of horses, motorcycles, captured Czech and French weapons and other ammunition, which the quartermaster service at the headquarters of the Western Group of German Forces in Paris was able to beg from Berlin. Lacking weapons, ammunition, and trained manpower, the 302nd commander wisely decided to concentrate his resources on covering the enemy's most likely offensive site: the rocky coast at Dieppe. Just as prudent was his order not to place the guns in pre-prepared firing positions, where they could be seen and attacked from the air. Scouring the coast during tactical reconnaissance flights on behalf of the Joint Operations Headquarters, the pilots, with all their desire, could not look inside the grottoes in the coastal cliffs of Dieppe. The wisdom of Major General Konrad Haase's simple but effective defensive plan became apparent to the defenders at the moment when flanking fire from assorted guns hidden in the grottoes and a captured French tank built into the dam began to mow down the Canadians climbing the steep rocky slope.

Since Mountbatten neglected the services SIS and a network of agents of the Office of Special Operations (Special Operations Executive - SOE) in France, his headquarters decided to use the services of electronic intelligence - if not on a strategic level (in this case it would have to deal with the Joint Intelligence Committee), then at least on a tactical level. The experience gained during the spring raid on St. Nazaire testified in favor of this measure. If the operational group of the headquarters could hear how the enemy reacts and what orders he receives directly during the battle, the military commanders of the Joint Operations Headquarters could act "with open eyes." This clever tactic worked much better during the raid on St. Nazaire than anyone at Cheadle (the headquarters of the radio interception service) could have imagined. Ironically, during the Dieppe operation, the air was overflowing with information, and the radio interception service of the Joint Operations Headquarters simply could not cope with the timely transmission of data to the air commander during the battle. However, the idea itself was reasonable.

As the day of the attack approached, concern grew over the success of Operation Jubilee and its secrecy. Secrecy was a major concern; after the cancellation of the first attack, this might have seemed pointless, but several leaks of information and loss of documents increased the need to keep the preparations for the operation secret - at least from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Even enthusiastic Canadians had doubts. Major General Roberts, commander of the infantry division, was uneasy about the whole plan, but the cheerful assurances of Mountbatten and the staff of the Joint Operations Headquarters somewhat reassured him. After all, he reasoned, they were experienced staff officers, no match for me. His concern, however, was shared by many Canadians.

Captain Austin Stanton, adjutant of the Calgary Tank Regiment, admitted: "In my opinion, the operation had no chance." He was so pessimistic that on the day of the operation he dressed in all new in case he was taken prisoner, which greatly angered his commander. Be that as it may, on the night of August 18, the Calgary Tank Regiment embarked on a new 60-meter tank landing ship (TDK) in Newhaven in full view of a silent crowd of civilians. “When we stood in line at the entrance to the docks,” Stanton recalled, “there was an ominous silence.” Along with 4,963 other members of Operation Jubilee boarding 237 ships, the alarmed adjutant of the Canadian Armored Regiment sailed off to face the battle.

The attack failed from the start. The German navy carried out regular patrols to supervise maritime commercial shipping along the French coastline. This fact, including the schedule of patrol convoys, was well known in Dover and Portsmouth, where coastal surface radars were located. However, more precise details about the convoys were kept secret at the request of senior management, as they came from confidential strategic sources, such as the Enigma message decryption team. No one from Mountbatgen's intelligence headquarters asked for details about German movements in the English Channel on 18 and 19 August. To make such a request would be to inform the Joint Intelligence Committee, and with it the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the operation.

The result was predictable. Early on the morning of 19 August, as the vessels carrying the personnel of the 3rd Commando Battalion approached the cliffs at Belleville and Berneval east of Dieppe, their escort stumbled upon a coastal German convoy in the darkness. Despite two clear signals at 01.27 and 02.44 by Royal Navy radar from England to the commander of the troops aboard the destroyer Culp with the exact position of the German convoy, the warning did not reach the escort on the eastern flank. The plan of the Joint Operations Headquarters began to falter from the first steps.

The participants in Operation Jubilee only became aware of the German convoy when an illuminating shell flashed over their heads and, in its cold, unsteady light, the German escort opened fire, which disabled gunboat No. 5, which provided direct cover for the landing craft on the eastern flank. As other Royal Navy escorts approached, a fierce exchange of fire broke out with tracer shells flying in all directions "like fireworks". As a result, the Germans were forced to retreat with heavy losses. Operation Jubilee lost the element of surprise. At dawn, the ships of the eastern flank with the paratroopers on board, who did not have time to recover from surprise, approached the shore in an alarming silence. According to one of the sergeants of the 3rd Commando Battalion, "Through the binoculars you could see the damned Germans watching through their binoculars how we landed on the beach."

With the first rays of the sun, several attacks began at once. To the east, on the left flank, the 3rd Commando Battalion, under the command of the formidable Peter Young (who was watching the nighttime firefight from its very epicenter), overcame barbed wire, "with which the Hans carefully entangled the entire cliff - probably in order to make it easier for us rise", and carried out a successful attack that silenced the Goebbels artillery battery. By noon, Young was back in New Haven with his field uniform torn to shreds and his hands torn to shreds. On the extreme western flank at Varengeville, the disciplined 4th Commando Battalion under Lord Lovat destroyed the Hess Battery's guns in an exemplary double envelopment maneuver.

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